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Motto:   ”If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is 
the prime force motivating control, we must conclude that 
the interests of control are different from and often 
radically opposed to those of ownership.”  
A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, 1932, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, pp. 114. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An inevitable part of the process of transition in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) after the demise of central planning was the privatization of the majority of 
state-owned assets with the aim of providing enterprises with incentives and skills for so 
needed restructuring. Thus one of the most frequently raised questions in the context of 
economic and institutional transition has been: “How does privatization affect restructuring?”  
This question has been examined by a number of economists, usually in its more 
specified modifications asking either how the identity of new owners matters, i.e. whether 
they are state/private, insiders/outsiders, managers/other employees, domestic/foreign (see 
Carlin et al. 1995; Earle and Estrin 1997; Claessens et al. 1997; Halpern and Körösi 1998; 
Earle and Telegdy 2000; Makhija and Spiro 2000), or how the emerged level of ownership 
concentration matters for firm’s behavior (Earle and Estrin 1997; Claessens et al. 1998; 
Makhija and Spiro 2000).  
This ‘transition debate’ on the privatization-restructuring relationship has been largely 
inspired by a much older economic debate on the ownership-performance relationship in 
general. The start of this ‘general debate’ dates back to 1932 when Berle and Means 
published their Modern Corporation and Private Property in which they argued that higher 
ownership concentration translates to stronger abilities of shareholders to monitor managers 
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and thus positively affects a firm’s performance. For decades, a number of economists
1, 
building on Berle and Means’ idea of the separation of ownership and control, came up with 
many alternative hypotheses on the concentration-performance relationship. With the 
expansion of econometric modeling more and more researchers also tested their hypotheses 
empirically, usually on data from U.S. companies. The positions of economists in this field 
range from that of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who denied the existence of any relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance, to that of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1987), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Stulz (1988), or McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), who discussed different types of a non-monotonous shape of the relationship.  
This thesis examines the dependence of restructuring of manufacturing enterprises on 
private outside ownership concentration in a country that was the pioneer, among the 
transition economies, in mass applying voucher privatization – the Czech Republic. Out of the 
contributions to the ‘transition debate’ that are mentioned above, two have an intimately close 
relationship to the purpose of this paper. The first is the study of Claessens et al.(1998) which, 
using a sample of 706 Czech companies for the period 1992-1997, finds strong support for a 
positive and concave effect of ownership concentration on profitability
2 and somewhat weaker 
support for a similar relationship between concentration and labor productivity
3. However, 
when the authors instrument ownership concentration, the obtained two-step results do not 
infer anything about the concavity/convexity of the function, though the positive effect of 
ownership concentration on profitability and productivity remains significant. The second is 
the paper of Makhija and Spiro (2000) which, using the sample of all 988 Czech companies 
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1   Predominantly representatives of the institutional theory of firm, agency theory, transaction costs economics, 
theory of property rights and other mutually not exclusive fields. 
2   Profitability is there defined as gross operating profit over net fixed assets plus inventory. 
3   Labor productivity is there defined as value added per employee. 
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privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization, studies the dependence of the market 
value (measured by Tobin’s Q) of the firms on the identity of owners. Ownership 
concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, is included as a control variable and its sign 
is positive and significant in all reported estimations. Thus both studies document the benefits 
of ownership concentration. 
In this thesis, however, not only the benefits but also the costs of ownership 
concentration are discussed in the context of the specific institutional setup. Primary 
justification for this is the following. Although it was feared that the voucher scheme would 
create a highly diffuse ownership structure, this result has to a large extent been avoided by 
introducing investment privatization funds (IPFs) to the scheme. However, due to insufficient 
complementary regulation of the over-night emerged investment fund industry, combined 
with the neglected protection of minority shareholders’ rights, weak bankruptcy law and other 
institutional drawbacks including weak system of enforcement, it can be argued that the costs 
of concentration have been largely present (Coffee 1996; Mejstřík et al. 1997; Mertlík 1998 
and many others). It is not by chance that the Czech case has contributed to the international 
economic vocabulary with the word tunneling. 
As an extremely valuable source for the analysis of the costs and benefits of ownership 
concentration, the arguments of Morck et al. (1988) are used and modified in order to fit the 
Czech case. Morck et al. illustrate the benefits of inside ownership concentration in the U.S. 
firms of the 1980’s by an incentive effect and the costs by the effect of entrenchment. The 
incentive effect clearly applies to the examination of the private outside ownership 
concentration in the Czech firms of the 1990’s as well. The costs of concentration in the 
Czech case, however, are viewed as resulting from the combination of a manager-
entrenchment effect,  outsider-entrenchment effect and a transition-specific tunneling 
effect. As a result of the analysis of these four effects, a strong and a weak form of a 
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hypothesis concerning the shape of the concentration-restructuring function are derived. The 
hypothesis – that the function, otherwise increasing, has a negative (strong form) or at least 
attenuated (weak form) slope in an inner part of its domain – is tested on an unbalanced panel 
of 90 Czech manufacturing companies for 1991-1998, using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
random and fixed effects (RE and FE), and instrumental variables (IV) estimations to remove 
possible selection bias.  
The paper consists of three parts. Chapter 1 describes the character of ownership 
structure in the Czech Republic after privatization and relevant features of the overall 
institutional setup. Special attention is devoted to the role of investment privatization funds 
and to the residual property of the state. Chapter 2 starts with a brief summary of the ‘general 
debate’ and the ‘transition debate’ and then uses their main accomplishments for developing 
the hypothesis about the actual dependence of restructuring on ownership concentration in the 
Czech conditions. The third chapter tests this hypothesis on the firm-level panel data in four 
steps. First, it discusses the problems of measuring both restructuring and ownership 
concentration, then it specifies the models to be applied, after that it describes the data using 
summary statistics and, finally, it presents and interprets the empirical results. At the end of 
the paper, the main contribution and implications are briefly discussed. 
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1. PRIVATIZATION AND THE CZECH MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Until 1989, Czechoslovakia represented one of the most state-controlled socialist 
economies with only a negligible private sector employing 1.2% of the labor force and 
producing not more than 4% of the GDP. The process of privatization of state-owned 
productive capacities started immediately in 1990 in both logically and morally the most 
acceptable part, property restitution. This program was designed to return mostly agricultural 
land, apartment buildings and some shares of industrial enterprises nationalized after 1948 to 
the initial owners or their heirs and was vigorously pursued during 1990 and 1991. In total, it 
comprised property of the value of almost 200 billion crowns
4 (Mládek 1994). 
The second part, small-scale privatization, proceeded between April 1991 and 
December 1993 by public auctions of about 22,000 small economic units out of which 18,000 
were sold during the first twelve months of the program. Only domestic citizens could 
participate and bid for these shops, restaurants, hotels, small factories and so forth. The value 
of all the assets, which the state disposed of through the small-scale privatization, as reflected 
by the final prices within the auctions, was about 30 billion crowns (Earle et al. 1994). 
Furthermore, state-owned productive assets worth 350 billion crowns were 
municipalized and co-operatives worth 150 billion crowns were transformed through various 
ways (Mládek 1994). Almost all these assets of the overall value of approximately 730 billion 
crowns were just small economic units. The real core of the economy was still to be privatized 
through mass (large-scale) privatization. 
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4   Term “crowns” is used in this paper to denote Czechoslovak korunas or crowns (CSK) in the period until 
January 7, 1993, and Czech korunas or crowns (CZK) after January 8, 1993, when the currencies of the Czech 
and Slovak Republics separated. In the period 1990-1996, the exchange rate was more or less fixed at 
approximately 28 crowns per US dollar. 
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1.1. Mass Privatization 
Large industrial enterprises and banks, together with other economic units not privatized 
through any of the above-mentioned programs entered mass privatization, launched in the 
spring of 1991. These firms, worth approximately 1,200 billion crowns were either liquidated
5 
or privatized within one of two waves of large-scale privatization, or their privatization – if 
any – was postponed for later. The methods of mass privatization included both standard 
methods (represented by public auctions, public tenders and direct sales) and a special 
innovation based on Milton Friedman’s suggestions from the 1970’s and the Polish academic 
debate from the 1980’s – voucher scheme.
6 Out of these two options, the latter played a 
substantially stronger part in the Czech mass privatization program than the former. In fact, 
the architects of the privatization initially planned to exclusively use the voucher method
7 but, 
finally, they were forced to abandon this idea and to use standard methods as well, though on 
average for smaller and less important companies. 
There is a large amount of literature describing the process of mass privatization in the 
Czech Republic. The vast majority of this literature starts with an identification of the voucher 
scheme as the principal method and continues with the description of this scheme. This is 
usually accompanied by some tables showing that the book value of the assets privatized 
through vouchers was 370 billion crowns and/or that the overall value of the 1,664 companies 
that entered the voucher scheme was 550 billion crowns. When reading these numbers, one 
might ask what happened to the other 2,000 companies worth approximately 650 billion 
                                                 
5   The assets of the liquidated firms were usually sold in public auctions. 
6   Leaving aside gratuitous transfers of residual shares mostly of utility companies to municipalities. 
7   For a structured argumentation about the reasons for preferring voucher privatization see Ježek (1997). 
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crowns. Is it really true that the voucher scheme was so crucial for the resulting ownership 
structure? What about the use of standard methods in the Czech privatization? 
It is true that the voucher scheme was the most crucial and it is true that the standard 
methods did not play a very significant role, but the above-mentioned numbers might be very 
misleading. Therefore this paper, using various sources of sometimes less and sometimes 
more exact numbers, tries to present an explicit overall digest clearly illustrating the crucial 
role of the voucher method in order to justify the focus on the voucher privatization and 
Investment Privatization Funds (IPFs). This ‘privatization tree’ is presented in Table 1 and 
commented on below. More specific attention will be devoted to these numbers in the 
following two sections when talking about the role of IPFs and that of the state.  
 Table 1: Czech Privatization in Numbers – Mass Privatization Tree 
As is obvious from the Table, in 1993 the state decided to keep, either forever or 
temporarily, 100% shares in companies representing 25% of all the assets in mass 
privatization. These were mostly large enterprises, usually with a certain degree of monopoly 
power and/or strategic importance (oil and energy industry, mining, steel industry etc.). 
Companies worth 45% of the 1,200 billion crowns were privatized through vouchers and 
other companies worth 15% through standard methods. The remaining 15% include 
companies that were liquidated, companies which were partly or entirely transferred for free 
to municipalities and companies which were partly or entirely restituted to their pre-
nationalization owners or their heirs.  
This implies that 60% (in terms of the book value) of all the enterprises the state 
decided to dispose of were privatized through voucher privatization. To put it in other way, 
the ratio of the assets of the companies that entered the voucher scheme to those that were 
sold by one of the three standard methods was 3:1. These numbers highlight the role voucher 
privatization played in the creation of new ownership structures in the post-socialist Czech 
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economy. This role is just somewhat mitigated by two facts. First, assets worth 730 billion 
crowns had already been privatized through other methods before the mass privatization, and 
second, the state still maintained a strong position in many companies – both as an absolute 
owner and as a blockholder of usually 34%, 51% or 67% shares. However, when attention is 
focused on the manufacturing sector in particular, as is the case of this paper, the importance 
of vouchers seems even larger because these mitigating factors become weaker – both 
previous privatization and the state presence (at least the one of the absolute form) concern 
mostly non-manufacturing industries. 
The general goal of the reformers with respect to the manufacturing industry was 
restructuring. The main tool used to achieve this goal was the change in ownership structure. 
The most significant step toward this change was mass privatization, the most important part 
of which was the voucher scheme. And as Investment Privatization Funds were eventually the 
main actors within this scheme, it is natural to start a proper discussion of the post-
privatization ownership structure and its effects on industrial restructuring within the 
manufacturing sector with a description of these newly emerged institutions. 
1.2. Voucher Privatization and Investment Privatization Funds 
Besides the obvious advantages of the voucher method (such as speed, social justice, 
political feasibility, limited possibility of abusing political power) its expected costs were 
limited availability of capital for restructuring. Another, related fear was that the voucher 
privatization would create such a dispersed ownership that the control would be, in fact, 
entirely separated from owners and transferred to managers. This was one of the reasons for 
introducing the status of Investment Privatization Fund (IPF), the role of which would be to 
constitute an effective link between the dispersed owners and the managers and thus to serve 
as a monitoring device. In fact, after the first wave of the voucher privatization, it became 
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clear that the control had been in most of the cases indeed separated from the owners but 
transferred to over-night powerful IPFs rather than to the managers of the privatized 
companies. In order to make clear what ownership concentration in the hands of IPFs means, 
it is necessary to explain the design of this new institution and the development of its 
regulation. Before doing so, let the paper emphasize that besides fulfilling the monitoring role, 
IPFs were also supposed to provide individual investors with the possibility of collective 
investment based on portfolio diversification. Designing IPFs as performers of both these 
roles, which are in contradiction with each other
8, resulted in the creation of a hybrid 
institution which is “neither fish nor fowl” (Coffee 1996, 183). 
The first implementation of IPFs to the legal frame can be seen in the “Large-Scale 
Privatization Act” of February 1991
9. This Act, nonetheless, does not specify the role and the 
function of the funds, it only prohibits them from participating in other than voucher 
privatization. IPFs are defined precisely in a federal government decree of September 1991
10, 
according to which the only requirements on an IPF are minimum capital of 100,000 crowns 
($ 3,600), professional qualifications of its supervisory board’s members, contract with a bank 
as its depository and license from the Ministry of Finance. The last requirement was rather 
formal and represented, in fact, no barrier. The government approached the IPFs in an 
extremely liberal way, allowing almost anyone to establish an IPF and relying on the people’s 
rationality which would lead to the success of the most credible funds (i.e. the bank-affiliated 
ones) only.  
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8   In western capital markets, the former is usually performed by industrial holdings, while the latter by mutual 
funds. For a comparative institutional analysis of these two types of institutions and investment privatization 
funds see Ellerman (1998). 
9   Officially called Act on the Consolidation of Transfer of State Owned Property to Other Persons, Act No. 
92/1991 Coll. 
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In October, the Ministry of Finance started its advertising campaign explaining the 
scheme to a wide public, trying to attract as many citizens as possible. This campaign that, 
according to sociological researches of that time, succeeded in attracting only 20% of the 
population, was immediately followed by the aggressive campaigns of various IPFs. Many 
funds pursued a strategy of promising usually from between ten and fifteen thousand crowns 
straight after the first wave
11. The vision of this amount of money “for sure” attracted people’s 
attention considerably more than possibly much higher but uncertain gains from investing 
vouchers directly in companies. From this time, the tendency of IPFs to play a really 
significant role in privatization was obvious. Altogether 429 both bank-affiliated and private 
(i.e. not affiliated with banks) IPFs were established and participated in the first wave – 264 in 
the Czech Republic and 165 in the Slovak Republic. It is worth mentioning that no state-
owned IPF was established
12. 
The unexpected boom of IPFs accompanied by their aggressive advertising campaign, 
especially that of HC&C
13 which was obviously becoming very successful in attracting 
individuals’ vouchers even though it was not affiliated with any bank, seemed dangerous to 
the government. This fear triggered a legislative reaction in the form of the approval of 
amendments to some existing legal norms in January 1992
14. IPFs were required to invest no 
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10  Federal Government Decree No. 383/1991 Coll. 
11  Some banks promised, alternatively, providing loans to those that invest their vouchers to IPFs founded by 
the banks’ investment companies. For example Investiční banka promised CSK 15,000 loan to those who 
invested their entire voucher book with IPFs founded by Investiční’s investment company PIAS, while PIAS 
offered to buy a voucher book investment in its funds at CSK 11,000. Thus, anyone who invested his or her 
all vouchers with any PIAS’s fund was offered an option to get the loan, the cash or just the share in the fund. 
(Coffee 1996) 
12  Nevertheless, Czechoslovak banks where the state still kept controlling shares were permitted to establish 
their IPFs. 
13    Harvard Capital & Consulting was an investment company with 8 daughter IPFs, established by Viktor 
Kožený, whom the international financial community later assigned the name ‘Pirate from Prague’. 
14  Amendments No. 67/1992 Coll. and 69/1992 Coll. to Federal Government Decree No. 383/1991 Coll. 
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more than 10% of their capital in any one security and to own no more than 20% of any single 
issuer. Furthermore, IPFs established by the same parent company could acquire at most 40% 
of one issuer. Before the first bidding round of the privatization started, several discretionary 
changes of the IPFs’ regulation were approved, including the exclusion of civil servants from 
boards of directors and supervisory boards of IPFs and imposing a regulation on the portfolio 
structure.  
A complex, but at the same time rather controversial legislative change came in May 
1992, immediately before the bidding process started. The Investment Companies and 
Investment Funds Act
15 codified all the discretionary changes passed until that time and 
brought new significant elements, some of which could not, however, then influence the first 
wave. In order to prevent non-transparent cross ownership structures, the law prohibited the 
“IPFs established by banks” from investing in banks under privatization (the founding bank as 
well as any other). However, in fact, since the bank-affiliated IPFs were not “established by 
banks” but by investment companies that were established (and 100% owned) by banks, it 
became legally possible for cross ownership to emerge. Furthermore, open-ended and closed-
end mutual funds were introduced, the licensing procedure became stricter, rules dealing with 
limiting and spreading risk were implemented etc. But this stricter regulation was only de 
iure; de facto the approach to IPFs in the second wave was basically still very liberal. The 
Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act also determined the maximum 
compensation that investment companies could get annually from the funds at the level of 2% 
of the average value of IPF’s property or 20% of its profit.  
 
  - 11 - 
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The first wave of voucher privatization succeeded in creating a large capital market 
which was, by the Securities Act
16 from 1992, run by two organizers – The Prague Stock 
Exchange and RM-S Securities Exchange. The first and most evident characteristic of the 
market was unexpectedly high concentration of ownership. Many IPFs, particularly private 
ones, tended to reach the 20% ceiling. Thus HC&C, which was the third most successful 
collector of vouchers (after two bank-affiliated funds), diversified its portfolio in 51 
companies only
17. Three funds in alliances often owned majority. The post-privatization 
ownership structure was highly concentrated, both in the sense that in almost every privatized 
enterprise only few owners together had a majority of the shares (see Table 2) and that only 
about ten to fifteen investment groups acquired a majority of all the privatized assets. 
 Table 2: The Concentration of Ownership by Funds after Voucher Privatization 
The discrepancy between the ex ante expectations and the ex post reality is of a great 
significance because there are many features connected with the unanticipated shifts in 
control, especially those concerning incentives for IPFs, which would have been better treated 
during the implementation of the privatization legal framework, if such shifts in control had 
been anticipated. The Czech voucher privatization to outsiders with the presence of 
investment privatization funds was, in a simple language, equivalent to the transfer of 
ownership from the state to 6 million dispersed shareholders and of control from the state
18 to 
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16  Act No. 591/1992 Coll. 
17   IPFs affiliated with the biggest Czech banks, in contrast, diversified their portfolios in hundreds of 
companies. This was, according to some observers, due to the irrational behavior of the banks during the 
bidding rounds stemming from their fear that they would not be able to allocate all the vouchers that they 
acquired. Others argue that the broad diversification was fully rational, aimed to acquire at least toe-hold 
stake in the highest possible number of companies. The thing is that 10% share was usually enough to achieve 
a seat on the managing board. Why should then a bank seeking to get leverage for its business interests (not to 
restructure actively its firm) invest more than is necessary? (Coffee 1996) 
18  One can oppose that it was not the state but the managements that in many cases executed a factual control 
over the SOEs. Nevertheless, it is not a subject of this paper to discuss the position of control in the pre-
privatization period. 
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a small number of IPFs. Thus, many of the privatized enterprises were owned by millions of 
minority individual shareholders, controlled by IPFs and managed by managers appointed by 
the IPFs. The state, nonetheless, still remained very important player. In some of the voucher-
privatized companies, it owned a controlling block of shares. 
1.3. Residual State Property 
This section starts with the description of direct state ownership after the mass 
privatization (subsection A). After that, the character of the Czech type of cross-ownership is 
introduced (subsection B) and then used for some inference about indirect state ownership 
(subsection C). 
1.3.A. Direct State Ownership 
As was noted in the Section 1.1., companies worth 300 billion crowns remained entirely 
in the state property even after the two waves of mass privatization. In addition, the state 
retained partial control in many of the privatized companies. This can be inferred again from 
the Table 1. In the first wave of voucher privatization, only 61.4% of the assets of the 988 
included companies were privatized through vouchers, while 23.3% remained in the NPF and 
the remaining 15.3% were privatized by other means (predominantly gratuitous transfers to 
municipalities). The second wave of the voucher privatization concerned not only 676 other 
enterprises but also 185 companies that were already included in the first wave. This means 
that out of the first-wave companies’ shares that remained in the NPF, some were privatized 
in the second wave. Therefore not 23.3% but rather some 15% of the first-wave companies 
shares should be considered as remaining in the state property. This represents the value of 
approximately 60 billion crowns. In the second wave of voucher privatization, the state 
decided to keep around 15 to 20 percent of the shares, worth 30 to 40 billion crowns. 
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Furthermore, the state retained some blocks of shares in enterprises that were transformed to 
joint stock companies (corporatized) but not privatized through vouchers. In non-corporatized 
firms that were either sold by standard methods or transferred to municipalities or restituted, 
the state did not keep any direct ownership control. 
Altogether it can be stated that besides the absolute control over companies worth 
together 300 billion crowns, the state kept shares worth 110 to 150 billion crowns (i.e. 15-
20%) in corporatized companies and no property in other companies included in the mass 
privatization, representing 150 billion crowns.  
Looking at the analysis of the residual direct state property provided by Kočenda 
(1999), one can observe that the National Property Fund (NPF) had remained largely involved 
in the ownership structures until the late 1990’s. The portfolio of the NPF consisted of 369 
companies with 100% shares in 28 of them and with shares between 50% and 100% in 26 of 
the companies. Thus the state owned at least majority in 15% of the 369 companies, which 
does not suggest very large influence on the economy. However, when the book value of the 
companies is taken into account, the picture changes significantly. The overall value of the 
369 companies was 440 billion crowns, while that of the 54 companies, where the state owned 
more than 50%, was 180 billion crowns. Furthermore, there were other companies of the 
overall value of 153 billion crowns where the state, despite having minority share, could 
effectively control the corporate boards either through golden shares or through declaring 
such companies as strategic. Thus it can be concluded that in the end of the 1990’s the state 
directly controlled companies worth 333 billion crowns which represents 76% of the value of 
all the companies in the NPF’s portfolio. 
However, this picture is still not complete as there are other, indirect links through 
which the state affects the privatized enterprises. Before turning the attention at these links, an 
important specificity of the Czech privatization has to be introduced – cross-ownership.  
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1.3.B. Cross-ownership in the Banking Sector 
The IPFs that participated in the voucher privatization were basically of two types – 
those affiliated with domestic banks and those established by individuals or financial 
institutions independent of domestic banks. Only the former type of IPFs was expected to 
succeed significantly in attracting vouchers due to its reputation, country-wide network etc. 
Thus the features of universal banking, i.e. a large amount of companies in the property of 
banks (or at least under their control through bank-managed IPFs), were expected to appear. 
Indeed, under the newly arisen Czech type of universal banking, the banks provided softer 
financing, prolonged inefficiency, and delayed bankruptcies of “their” companies. Thus they 
harmed their depositors and shareholders, increased bad debts, and spoiled the competition on 
the loan market, discriminating against those companies that could not enjoy such preferential 
banking treatment.
19  
Together with this more or less expected feature of the banking sector, a problem of 
highly non-transparent cross-ownership appeared which was, however, attempted to be 
prevented
20 and thus not really expected to happen. The bank-affiliated IPFs acquired shares 
in other banks but, more strikingly, also in their founding banks, so that the banks became co-
owners of each other
21 and some of them owned indirectly even their own shares. It is worth 
emphasizing the distinction between ownership and control. If a bank founds an IPF (directly 
or indirectly), it becomes a pure manager of the fund’s property while the fund’s shareholders 
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19 These problems of the universal banking without large shares in the controlled enterprises (by Czech 
observers often called “banking socialism”) are rather softened by the empirical study by Buchtíková and 
Čapek (1997) who conclude that company panel data from 1993-1995 do not allow to suggest the existence of 
banks’ providing their companies with credits they do not need. Furthermore, Claessens, Djankov, Pohl 
(1996) attributed to Czech banks a positive role in creating corporate governance in privatized companies. 
20  See the Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act from May 1992 discussed in the Section 1.2. above. 
21  Some bank-affiliated IPFs (in particular Investiční Banka’s IPFs) were more active in investing to other banks 
than the others. Thus, cross ownership was not fully reciprocal. (Coffee 1996) 
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are its owners. However, the banks became later co-owners of their funds due to the 
marketing promises from the pre-privatization advertisement campaign of buying-out the 
IPFs’ shares for certain ex ante price. In the ownership structure after privatization, therefore, 
banks managed and co-owned most of the funds that became over night powerful owners of 
large enterprises and banks (including their “grandparent” banks). 
1.3.C. Indirect State Ownership 
Although the architects of voucher privatization decided to prohibit state and non-
commercialized state enterprises from establishing IPFs in order to transfer the state property 
to really private owners, the state remained significantly involved and locked in the post-
privatization ownership structures – not only in the non-privatized companies and shares but 
also in several companies that were ‘fully’ privatized. The logic of this lies in the fact that the 
state kept controlling blocks in the largest banks with the intent to sell them later to strategic 
investors. These banks controlled some of the most important IPFs. Thus the state retained 
influence on the companies under the control of these bank-affiliated funds. For illustration, 
IPFs of three largest banks – Česká spořitelna (ČS), Investiční banka (IB) and Komerční 
banka (KB) – where the state kept 40%, 45% and 44%, respectively, acquired in the first wave 
one third of all vouchers that were invested in funds, i.e. 20% of all the first-wave vouchers.  
The presence of cross-ownership even strengthened this leverage as the state, being 
involved in these non-transparent, mutually interlinked structures, had in fact stronger impact 
on the banks than the numbers about the state’s direct shares in them would suggest.
22 Careful 
analysis of the primary, first degree, second degree and third degree property involvement of 
the state, as well as that of the most important financial groups in five major banks (including 
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ČS, IB and KB), representing almost 90% of the total assets of the Czech banking sector, is 
provided in Turnovec (1998). 
The position of the state in the cross-ownership structures started to diminish in 1998 
when the privatization of the largest banks was finally launched after the long-lasting status 
quo. The state’s blocks of shares of these banks have been already sold to foreign strategic 
investors, except for that of Komerční banka, the privatization of which is being processed in 
these months. 
1.4. Institutional Setup and Corporate Governance 
Mass privatization created a new capital market the main characteristics of which were 
its enormous size and at the same time very low liquidity and transparency. The majority of 
share trading (according to most observers, over 90%
23) took place off the exchange, often in 
the form of swaps among voucher funds (Pistor and Spicer 1996). Pistor and Spicer see the 
causes of insider dealings and those of the lack of transparency partly in the large stakes 
acquired by IPFs during privatization, whose liquidation on official markets would be 
necessarily connected with steep discounts in prices, and partly in the lack of oversight and 
law enforcement on the capital market. 
According to Coffee (1996), many funds were trading at discounts up to 80% and 
overall demand for their shares was low. This would normally attract some group that would 
buy-out the IPF, fire the managers and increase the value significantly but the management 
companies had long-term non-cancelable contracts with their IPFs (6-10 years). This applies 
                                                                                                                                                         
22  Moreover, as Coffee (1996) suggests, it seems likely that the state was not willing to fight strongly against the 
cross-ownership because it could serve as an effective defense against the most powerful private fund HC&C, 
which represented a threat of hostile takeover of one of the biggest Czech banks, namely Česká Spořitelna. 
23  See Coffee (1996). 
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to IPFs organized as joint stock companies. On the other hand, mutual funds
24 are not legally 
new entities, but rather joint accounts of their “shareholders” with the management company, 
so the shares in such funds lack voting rights. These facts eliminate the incentives to hostile 
takeovers of the funds and thus the high discounts are possible and attainable. 
The regulation of the investment fund industry in the first years after voucher 
privatization was very weak. Nonetheless, it is not only this area of the economy which 
suffered from this disease. The liberal government followed an ex-post regulation approach 
with the argument that the state should not impose significant regulation from above as the 
most effective institutions are those that evolve spontaneously ‘from below’.
25 Let the paper 
now briefly describe the development of the regulation of IPFs after the two waves of voucher 
privatization.  
The first important ex post change came in mid-1996, when the ICs and IFs Act was 
modified. IPFs were significantly forced to follow portfolio diversification strategy, but 
before the legislation became valid, the IPFs were permitted to transform to industrial 
holdings. In fact, large number of funds did so and escaped thus the diversification 
requirements (including the 20% ceiling) and the regulation concerning IPFs.
26 Generally, 
private funds transformed to holdings, while the bank-affiliated ones remained funds and 
some of them even transformed from the initial type (joint stock fund) to mutual fund or from 
closed-end to open-ended mutual fund. The Act was modified again in 1998 towards even 
higher degree of portfolio diversification. In particular, the 20% ceiling of the share of any 
 
  - 18 - 
                                                 
24  These emerged before the second wave. 
25  This view has been called by many observers misunderstood liberalism.  The natural source of the disgust to 
any kind of regulation can be seen in the painful experience from communist over-regulation. Looking back, 
one of the three ‘godfathers’ of the voucher privatization, Dušan Tříska (the other two were Václav Klaus and 
Tomáš Ježek), calls it with a portion of self-criticism liberalism in extreme (Tříska 1996) 
26  On the other hand, holdings are taxed more. 
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single issuer was lowered to 11%. That year brought yet another, qualitatively much more 
significant, change. Security Exchange Commission, SEC, was established (long 5 years after 
the emergence of the capital market). Until that time, no special regulatory authority 
supervised the capital market. The new commission has been given quite high prerogatives 
and independence. Furthermore, it can levy more efficient sanctions that any court could until 
that time. The emergence of this regulatory body has undoubtedly contributed to better 
enforcing of the rules on the capital market.  
Besides the improvements ‘from above’, some positive contributions to the institutional 
setup came also ‘from below’ in the form of the emergence of ethical codes and self-
regulatory organizations. A representative organization of such kind is UNIS
27, voluntary self-
regulatory association of the vast majority of Czech investment funds and companies 
established in mid-1996 in reaction to the deep crisis of public confidence in the investment 
fund industry. However, the creation of UNIS does not justify the above-mentioned approach 
of the liberal government to regulation because it took place only after the largest frauds had 
been done and the ‘most unethically behaving’ funds had already cheated their shareholders 
and left the industry. For the case study of UNIS ČR and its role in improving the institutional 
environment on the Czech capital market, see Sedláček and Vychodil (2001). 
As for the ex-post regulation approach, it applied not only to the investment fund 
industry and capital market in general, but also to the overall business environment regulation. 
The Commercial Code and Bankruptcy Law were similarly imperfect implying, in particular, 
low protection of minority shareholders’ rights and unfavorable position of creditors towards 
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27 UNIS ČR - Union of Investment Companies of Czech Republic. 
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debtors.
28 The state authorities, following the ex-post regulation approach, have been 
frequently adjusting these norms. The process of the ad hoc adjustment of the relevant laws 
has been rather successful but this has not solved the problems because the Czech economy 
has still suffered from very low level of enforcement of its rules by the courts. No matter how 
well a law is written, it is of no use as long as there is no-one to enforce it. 
Kudrna et al. (2000) present the results of a survey on ‘Corporate Governance Risk’
29 in 
the Czech Republic made among 50 top managers, economic consultants and academicians. 
The primer output of this survey is the index of corporate governance risk, the highest 
possible value of which is 28 (this represents the lowest level of the risk - G7 countries are 
assumed to reach values above 21), consisting of four sub-indices – measuring the quality of 
(1) corporate law, (2) legal processes, (3) regulatory regime and (4) ethical overlay – which 
may reach at most 7 points each. The level of the overall index in the Czech Republic is 11 
(while in Russia 4 and in Poland 16)
30, while the values of the sub-indices are 3.1, 1.5, 4.0 and 
2.8, respectively. This supports the statement that the enforcement of laws by the courts (legal 
processes – 1.5 points out of 7) represents larger problem of the Czech business environment 
than the definitions of the laws themselves (corporate law – 3.1 points out of 7). The best 
assessed aspect of the environment is the regulatory regime sub-index (4.0 points out of 7) 
which reflects especially how the Czech regulatory authorities (the SEC, Central Bank and 
Antimonopoly Office) and financial auditors fulfill their roles. 
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28  For the identification of the key problems of the Bankruptcy Law and relevant parts of the Commercial Code 
and the discussion of the development of these norms, see Kudrna et al. (2000). 
29  The concept of ‘Corporate Governance Risk Index’ has been developed by David Crichton-Miller and Phillip 
Worman (1999). Their creation of the methodology of measuring this index was based on the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (1998).   
30  See Crichton-Miller and Worman (1999). 
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To sum up, the institutional environment of the Czech economy in the first five years 
after mass privatization was very weak and thus provided a large space for moral hazard and 
cheating in general. Despite some positive changes (such as the establishment of the SEC in 
1998 or the improvement of the wording of some important laws) it has still remained rather 
weak as some of its crucial gaps have not been removed yet (especially the low speed and 
cost-efficiency of legal redress). This conclusion is persuasively supported by the fact that the 
most frequently quoted ‘lesson from the Czech transition’ is that ‘institutions matter’.  
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2. THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION – HYPOTHESIS 
The aim of this chapter is to derive a hypothesis about the shape of the function which 
relates restructuring to ownership concentration in the Czech manufacturing sector after 
privatization. Prior to the argumentation itself, which comes only in 2.3, two sources of its 
inspiration are presented – the Western ‘general debate’ with both its theoretical concepts and 
empirical results (Section 2.1) and the empirically supported arguments of the ‘transition 
debate’ (Section 2.2). 
2.1. General Debate 
The classical economic paradigm dealt with the firm as a black box, as an individual 
indivisible agent maximizing profits. In a theory built on this assumption, there is no space for 
considerations of alternative ownership arrangements within firms. Thus, only when Berle 
and Means (1932) came with a soundly articulated and empirically supported statement that 
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance, 
did it provoke other economists to examine the importance of corporate ownership for 
economic behavior. Berle and Means’ main argument was that dispersed ownership leaves 
strong control rights in the hands of managers whose interests are often not aligned with those 
of shareholders, i.e. with the corporate performance translated to share value. 
The most influential argument against the existence of any kind of such a relation so far 
has been the Coase Theorem
31, which (developed implicitly by Demsetz and Lehn 1985) 
                                                 
31  The Coase Theorem was explicitly introduced by George Stigler who reformulated an idea stated by Ronald 
Coase in The Problem of Social Cost from 1960. The theorem has been cited in several ways. Let this paper 
use the definition offered by Ronald Coase himself in 1994. ”In a regime of zero transaction costs - an 
assumption of standard economic theory - negotiations between the parties would lead to those arrangements 
being made which would maximize wealth, and this irrespective of the initial assignment of rights” (Coase 
1994, 10). 
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implies that in economies of zero transaction costs connected with alternating ownership 
arrangements, ownership structure adjusts to such a state which ensures owners enough 
monitoring ability over managers. Coase (1994) himself emphasized that the implication of 
the so-called Coase Theorem was that since zero transaction costs assumption is very strong 
and unrealistic in a variety of cases, positive transaction costs economics has to be developed, 
in which the importance of ownership (as well as that of the legal system and other 
institutions) would become immediately clear. Nevertheless, it has been argued that in the 
most developed market economies, the transaction costs connected with alternating ownership 
structure are very low which makes ownership concentration strongly endogenous. In this 
argument the expected gain from monitoring and the costs of alternative ownership structures 
vary across firms so that the revealed level of ownership concentration is the optimal one for 
each single firm.   
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide empirical evidence for this argument, using a sample 
of 511 large U.S. corporations. They start with the identification of the determinants of 
ownership structure – size, control potential, regulation and amenity potential – and the 
regression of concentration variables on them by OLS. Furthermore, recursive estimates of 
mean accounting profit rates on the endogenous concentration and other variables – capital, 
advertising and R&D relative expenditures, assets, firm specific risk and dummies for utilities 
and financial companies – assign slightly negative and insignificant coefficients to all used 
measures of ownership concentration, which makes the authors convincingly conclude that no 
relationship can be found between ownership structure and performance in developed market 
economies. 
Those, who oppose this view and claim that there exists a certain relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance, vary in both theoretically and 
empirically drawn conclusions about the shape of the function. The initiators of the debate 
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(Berle and Means 1932) argued for a positive relation without any specification of its shape. 
Later the question was raised whether the relation is really monotonous. Some economists 
(Stulz 1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990) answer this question talking about a reversed U-
shape of the relationship. Stulz, emphasizing the role of takeovers, developed a model which 
suggested an increasing value of a firm as the managerial ownership grows from zero to fifty 
percent and decreasing value of the firm after this point when the probability of takeover 
disappears. McConnell and Servaes then present an empirical support for Stulz’s model, 
regressing Tobin’s Q on insider ownership for two data sets (1,173 U.S. firms for 1976 and 
1,093 for 1986).  
Some other empirical studies document somewhat more complicated shapes of the 
curve. Hermalin and Weisbach (1987) examined data on 134 NYSE firms for five years with 
three-year intervals between 1971 and 1983 and find that Tobin’s Q raises as CEO stock 
ownership increases from 0% and 1%, falls between 1% and 5%, then again rises up to the 
20% CEO stock ownership and falls again after this margin. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) discuss a non-linear shape of the function as a result of two opposing forces – the 
larger the share the managers own, the more they can allocate the firm’s assets in their own 
interests (entrenchment effect), but at the same time, their interests become more aligned with 
those of the firm (incentive effect). Analyzing a sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms for 1980, 
Morck  et al. conclude that the relationship between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership is 
positive between 0% and 5%, negative between 5% and 25% and slightly positive after that. 
The piece of Morck et al. represented a crucial contribution for the further development 
of the ‘general debate’ because their clear and structured approach was the first to attract 
general attention to the existence of the costs of ownership concentration besides its benefits.  
No matter how these approaches differ, they all have one factor in common – they see 
the reasoning behind the ownership-performance relationship in the divergence of ownership 
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and control, assuming that the latter is in the hands of managers. Cubbin and Leech (1983) try 
to go further and, besides the degree of control, they emphasize the location of control. They 
distinguish internal versus external control (with respect to management), where the latter 
may be of four various types according to the identity of the external agent in control. Thus 
Cubbin and Leech stress the fact that not only ownership concentration but also the identity of 
the owners matter.
 32  
2.2. Transition Debate 
All this ‘general debate’, including the last-mentioned point, has had a large impact on 
the ‘transition debate’. This impact is of two types as there can be distinguished two types of 
motivation of the ‘transition debate’ participants according to the fact whether their main 
concern lies in the ownership-performance relationship itself or in studying economic 
transition. For economists who have been involved in the long-lasting ‘general debate’, 
privatization in post-communist countries represents an extremely valuable natural 
experiment. Such researchers see in the analysis of the specific situation of transition 
countries a valuable contribution to the process of developing the theories of corporate 
governance. By contrast, the motivation of many other authors (both ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ 
– with respect to the reforming countries) lies predominantly in their strong concern for 
transition economies. In the privatization-restructuring relationship, they discover an 
interesting and/or crucial aspect of the reforming process. These researchers often intend to 
make a contribution to the general economic understanding of transition
33, to assess 
                                                 
32   An excellent overview of this ‘general debate’ on the ownership-performance relationship is provided in 
Shleifer and Vishny’s Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
33  In other words, they try to contribute to the development of the newly emerged fields, such as the ‘theory of 
privatization’ or ‘transition economics’. 
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privatization methods, to say their word in the debate on further privatization and 
restructuring policies and so forth, and they take the Western corporate governance literature 
as a useful building block for their work. 
As can be inferred from its structure and style, this thesis is motivated by the latter type 
of concern which means that the ‘general debate’ is here purely used as a valuable source of 
inspiration for studying the transition-specific type of the separation of ownership and control. 
Although the ‘transition debate’ can build extensively on the grounds of the preceding debate, 
anyone involved in this new discussion, regardless his or her type of motivation, has to be 
aware of the fact that the case of reforming CEE countries is in many respects different from 
the one of developed market economies. Not only the ‘players of the game’ but also the 
‘rules’ are different. The whole institutional environment, including corporate law, corporate 
governance practices, overall level of law enforcement or the state’s attitude, differs 
significantly from the one that the Western world is used to observing. 
This new debate still does not have many participants, at least not many of those 
working with data and presenting empirical results rather than theoretical hypotheses. This 
may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, as the data for such studies should describe the 
ownership structure and performance indicators for some years after privatization and the 
largest part of privatization was not terminated in any of the transition countries before 1993, 
the space for empirical work emerged only in the second half of the 1990’s. Secondly, it is not 
an easy task to find firm-level data of this type and it requires quite an effort from the 
researchers to collect such data, usually through enterprise surveys. 
The authors usually study the dependence of the performance or, alternatively, that of 
the value of the firm on the method of privatization and/or on the identity of the new owners. 
The results of Earle and Estrin (1997), Halpern and Körösi (1998), Earle and Telegdy (2000), 
Makhija and Spiro (2000) document the positive effects of privatization in general and 
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highlight positive or negative effects of individual privatization methods and/or the identity of 
new owners in Russia, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic, respectively. Only two of 
these studies took into consideration also ownership concentration, in addition to the identity 
of owners. Another study (Claessens et al. 1998) devotes to the concentration issue primary 
attention. The remainder of this section briefly presents the inferences these three studies 
made about the effects of ownership concentration. 
Earle and Estrin (1997) analyzed post-privatization ownership structure in the Russian 
manufacturing industry. Their study was based on a survey of 439 industrial enterprises from 
July 1994, when the voucher privatization program in Russia had just been terminated. The 
authors examined how several measures of ownership concentration together with variables 
describing the identity of owners affect restructuring
34. According to the OLS estimations of 
linear specifications, the effect of identity outweighs the effect of concentration among all 
types of outside owners in Russian corporate governance. However, IV estimates showed 
strong positive effect of concentration. Piece-wise linear regressions, run to account for 
possible non-monotonicity of the concentration-performance relationship, did not reveal any 
additional information. 
Makhija and Spiro (2000), using the sample of all 988 companies privatized in the first 
wave of Czech voucher privatization, studied the dependence of the market value (measured 
by Tobin’s Q) of the firms on the identity of owners. Ownership concentration, measured by 
the Herfindahl index
35, is here included only as a control variable. Always positive and 
significant estimates of the coefficient for this variable show a positive dependence of the 
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34    The authors’ proxies for restructuring were labor productivity, ‘restructuring index’ and some of its 
components. The composition of the ‘restructuring index’ is briefly commented on in Section 3.1.B of this 
thesis. 
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value of the firm on ownership concentration. As the authors focused their attention on the 
consideration of the identity of owners, they did not go further in examining the effect of 
concentration, i.e. they did not check for a specific shape of the generally positive 
relationship. 
Claesens, Djankov and Pohl (1998) analyzed 1993-1997 data about 706 firms listed on 
the Prague Stock Exchange to study the effect of ownership concentration on (1) Tobin’s Q, 
(2) profitability, (3) labor productivity and (4) the fact whether the firm establishes a new 
market department. The data set includes only those companies that were chosen for voucher 
privatization which means that usually at least three of the largest shareholders are IPFs, one 
might be the state and, in some cases, one is a strategic investor. The authors’ OLS, random-
effects and two-step estimations provide evidence for positive dependence of all the four 
performance and valuation variables on ownership concentration measured as the share of top 
five shareholders (T5). In each of the three estimations of profitability and productivity the 
squared T5 has negative coefficients, which suggests a concave shape of the concentration-
performance function. However, the quadratic relationship is not robust to the change in 
estimation method, as the negative coefficients, while significant in OLS and Random effect 
models, are insignificant when instruments are used. 
2.3. The Czech Case – Construction of Hypothesis 
This section, inspired by both the ‘general’ and the ‘transition’ debates, derives the 
hypothesis about the function relating industrial restructuring to ownership concentration in 
the case of Czech manufacturing enterprises. The following paragraphs refer to this function 
 
  - 28 - 








2 35  The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the squares of the ownership shares: . 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
as to ‘concentration-restructuring function’ R(C) with the domain between 0% and 100%. 
First of all, it is necessary to specify the terms restructuring and ownership concentration. 
2.3.A. Terms ‘Restructuring’ and ‘Ownership Concentration’ 
Restructuring is a process of a firm’s shift towards such product composition and cost 
structure, that leads to a long-run competitiveness of the firm. As such, restructuring includes 
the reallocation of labor, capital, management and other resources (Lieberman 1994). Some 
economists emphasize that restructuring is an instantaneous process common to enterprises all 
over the world and that it is, hence, misleading to consider restructuring as something specific 
for transition economies. The author of this paper understands this interpretation of the term 
restructuring, nevertheless, there has been no other word found that would more suitably call 
the specific process of transformation of the former state-owned enterprises to ‘normally 
functioning’ firms able to compete in the newly emerging market economy. Unlike the 
performance of companies in developed market economies, the level of restructuring is, due to 
its complexity, very hard to measure. The particular problems with measuring restructuring 
will be discussed in Section 3.1.B. 
The term ‘ownership concentration’ is very broad. Therefore the authors analyzing the 
effects of this variable usually specify whether they mean the concentration of private 
ownership, that of managerial ownership, that of outside ownership or some other type. This 
coincides with the Cubbin and Leech’s remark about the two dimensions of control – degree 
and location. This paper examines the effects of private outside ownership concentration, i.e. 
the concentration of ownership in the hands of owners other than the state and insiders. 
2.3.B. Inspiration and the Constraint of its Application 
The main inspiration for the argumentation about the shape of the concentration-
restructuring function can be seen in the excellent article of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny from 
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1988 (hereafter MSV), who studied the effect of managerial ownership in U.S. firms on their 
value measured by Tobin’s Q. They analyzed the relationship as consisting of two effects. The 
first effect, which can be called incentive effect, is based on the simple idea that the more 
shares one owns, the more are his or her incentives aligned with the firm’s performance. This 
effect has been the main transmission mechanism conventionally seen in the concentration-
performance relationship by many economists at least since the contribution of Berle and 
Means. It is exactly this effect that inspired many investors to reward the managers of their 
companies with the shares of the companies in order to eliminate the principal-agent problem. 
The second effect, that of entrenchment, represents the major contribution of the article. 
It stems from the fact that: 
‘a manager who controls a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity may have enough voting power or influence 
more generally to guarantee his employment with the firm at an attractive salary’ (Morck et al. 1988, 294).  
In fact, a note about what MSV called entrenchment can be found in the book written by 
Berle and Means more than half a century before the MSV’s article: 
“If those in control of a corporation reinvested its profits in an effort to enlarge their own power, their interests 
might run directly counter to those of the ‘owners’.” (Berle and Means 1932, 115-116) 
MSV argued that the entrenchment effect is not as simple as the incentive effect because 
entrenchment does not depend only on the share one owns but also on the specificity one 
possesses (tenure, status as owner, personality, monopoly on some firm-specific knowledge or 
skills etc.). However, they contend that the effect decreases corporate value as the managerial 
ownership grows up to some value (well before 50%) and then the effect disappears as the 
managers are fully entrenched for all higher shares. Furthermore, it can be logically inferred 
from the authors’ argumentation that conditions necessary for entrenchment are more strongly 
correlated with increased managerial ownership beyond some small value of board ownership 
(5%) than before it. Thus, should the entrenchment effect be illustrated by a plot of 
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managerial ownership and performance (assuming there is no other effect in place), the 
function would be decreasing and concave in the first band of concentration (until ‘well 
before 50%’) and constant afterwards. 
The analysis made by MSV for U.S. companies can be applied to Czech firms, but only 
to a limited extent as in the Czech economy of the 1990’s, the ‘players of the game’ as well as 
the ‘rules of the game’ were much different from those in the U.S. of the 1980’s. As the result 
of the mass privatization (see Sections 1.1 through 1.3), the ‘players’ of the Czech ‘game’, i.e. 
the largest private outside owners, were mostly IPFs and much less frequently individuals, 
domestic firms or foreign investors. The main features specifying the ‘rules’ of the Czech 
‘game’ consisted mainly of the weak protection of minority shareholders’ and creditors’ 
rights, low transparency and liquidity of the market with equities and the insufficient 
definition of bankruptcy procedures (see Section 1.4). This environment provided a large 
space for cheating of various forms, the most representative of which was called tunneling. 
Although the word tunneling, introduced by Czech journalists and politicians, had not 
been known in the international vocabulary of economics and finance until the 1990’s, the 
practice of tunneling itself was nothing new. It had been known under terms such as asset-
stripping or self-dealing. Again, a note about these practices can be found in Berle and Means’ 
book: 
“(P)rofits may be shifted from a parent corporation to a subsidiary in which the controlling group have a large 
interest, (...) profitable business may be diverted to a second corporation largely owned by the controlling 
group”, the controlling group ”may use ‘inside information’, (...) it may issue financial statements of a 
misleading character or distribute informal news items which further its own market manipulations.” (Berle and 
Means 1932, 115) 
The use of the term ‘tunneling’ was, however, not the only aspect distinguishing the 
Czech way of asset-stripping from unfair practices in the West. As a result of the neglected 
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regulation of the Czech investment fund industry, capital market, and business activities as a 
whole, tunneling very quickly spread in the economy and often became even clearly visible 
because the tunnelists were convinced that what they were doing was legal though not ethical. 
Thus ‘Czech tunneling’ differed from ‘Western asset-stripping’ in its extent and in that some 
forms of it were in fact legal and not punishable. Later, when the legal framework was 
improved, they became illegal but still remained not punishable due to the weak system of 
enforcement. 
2.3.C. The Construction of Hypothesis 
Let the paper now apply the arguments of MSV on the Czech environment of the 1990’s 
and thus derive the hypothesis about the concentration-restructuring relationship, R(C), in the 
specific territorial and historical context. As was already mentioned, the MSV’s analysis has 
to be modified in order to fit the conditions under examination.  
The applicability of the incentive effect is not a big problem. Although its shape in the 
Czech context is distorted by the low liquidity and transparency of the capital market, the 
effect is definitively positive over the whole domain – higher concentration means higher 
share for the largest outside investors which in turn makes them more concerned about the 
value of the shares. For simplicity, it is further assumed that the incentive effect has a constant 
positive value (i >0) over the whole domain. This means that the function R(C) would be 
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36  Thus the term ‘effect’ (be it that of incentives or any of the others discussed below) can be understood as the 
slope of the function R(C) assuming there are no other things that affect R(C). 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
             R(C)   
             Incentive effect 
 
  - 33 - 
     
      s l o p e   =   i     
 
 
           0%         100% 
 
The effect of entrenchment is also present and, indeed, very important in the Czech case 
but the analysis of the costs of concentration in the Czech Republic cannot consist only in this 
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Nevertheless, not only old managers but also (and in the Czech case even more 
importantly) new owners often tend to entrench. The owners can entrench through appointing 
themselves to the supervisory board or directly to the board of directors and exploiting private 
benefits from such a position. These benefits might have the form of high salaries and/or 
fringe benefits, ‘pumping’ out the information useful for their other business activities etc. 
This opportunity to entrench rises with the increase of concentration towards level E<50% 
when the outside owners are fully entrenched.  
The shape of this outsider-entrenchment effect is analogous to the MSV’s 
entrenchment effect but it is definitely stronger than the manager-entrenchment effect. This 
assertion is based on two streams of reasoning – one explaining why the manager-
entrenchment effect is weak and the other why the outsider-entrenchment effect is strong. The 
former stems from the fact that lower private outside concentration does not necessarily mean 
higher managerial ownership because there might be other agents in the ownership structure, 
such as production workers or the state. This makes the manager-entrenchment effect weak. 
The argument why the outsider-entrenchment effect is particularly strong in the Czech case is 
that the outside owners are mostly investment privatization funds, which are due to the weak 
regulation under effective control of their managers who, in fact, only benefit from 
entrenchment, the costs of which are shared by the dispersed funds’ shareholders. 
            R(C) 
              Outsider-entrenchment 




         0%   E      100% 
 
 
  - 34 - 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
Finally, when possessing at least a certain degree of control, T, the outside owners have 
the opportunity to reap private benefits from the firm by direct asset-stripping. This 
opportunity then rises with the increase of concentration after this point towards 100%, 
because of the decreasing need for creating coalitions, and this negatively affects the firm 
restructuring. Hence, there can be added another to the three previous effects, which is zero 
for concentration between zero and T, and negative after that. T<E
37 is defined as the 
minimum level of outside ownership concentration for which the largest outside owners can, 
at least in coalitions, exercise control over the company without being effectively monitored 
by others. If there were no other effects, the restructuring level would be constant until the 
concentration reaches T and decreasing after that. Moreover, the expected shape of the curve 
after this point is convex because the tunneling opportunities have likely diminishing 
returns.
38 As this effect reflects a feature which is so characteristic for the Czech case – 
tunneling – let this paper denote it as tunneling effect. The importance of the tunneling effect 
is again enhanced by the moral hazard situation stemming from the fact that the outsiders in 
control are predominantly investment funds whose managers might enjoy the fruits of 
tunneling without bearing its costs. 
             R(C) 





         0%    T      100% 
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37  Thus T < E < M. 
38    In other words, asset-stripping opportunities grow faster between, say, 30 and 50% concentration than 
between 80 and 100% concentration. 
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The overall effect of private outside ownership concentration on restructuring can be 
obtained as the sum of the four effects discussed above. Under some reasonable assumptions 
about the relative strengths and slopes of the individual effects, the resulting relationship is 
positive between zero and a certain level X (positive incentive effect and very small negative 
outside-entrenchment effect) and also between certain value Y>X and 100% (positive 
incentive effect, positive manager-entrenchment effect, and slightly negative tunneling effect). 
In the interval between X and Y, the effects representing the costs of ownership concentration 
– the outsider-entrenchment effect and the tunneling effect – are in their highest power, i.e. 
the negative components of the slope of R(C) reach their highest magnitude. If the incentive 
effect is strong enough, the overall slope may be still positive, though definitely lower than 
before the value X. If the negative effects together outweigh that of incentives, the function is 
decreasing. Thus two basic versions of the simplified illustration of the overall effect of 
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Two forms of the hypothesis are drawn from this argumentation: 
 
Weak form: 
R(C) is increasing in the whole domain but its slope  
between X and Y is smaller than elsewhere. 
 
Strong form: 
R(C) is increasing in the whole domain, except for the interval  
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3. EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION 
The empirical verification of the hypotheses stated in the previous chapter is based on 
micro-data collected by the Labor Project of Central European University in two enterprise 
surveys (carried out in 1996-1998 and 1998-1999 using the same sample). The source reports 
yearly data on 90 Czech manufacturing companies for the period of 1989-1998. Although the 
data set reports observations starting with 1989, this paper focuses on the period 1991-1998, 
i.e. on the period after the first companies in the sample had been privatized.  
This pool of hypothetically 720 observations suffers, however, from missing values, 
especially in the case of ownership variables. Therefore, some imputations will be used in 
order to fill some gaps and thus increase the degrees of freedom. Although these imputations 
necessarily weaken the conclusions that can be drawn from the econometric analysis, they are 
based on such assumptions that do not distort the information provided by the data to such 
extent that would make the effort to increase the number of available observations 
unjustifiable
39. However, even after such imputations, the panel remains unbalanced. 
3.1. Measuring Ownership Concentration and Restructuring 
The first step of the econometric analysis is to decide about the method of the 
measurement of the two underlying variables. The choice of the proxies in this paper is 
inspired by some empirical studies from both the ‘general debate’ and the ‘transition debate’. 
                                                 
39  This is not the only trade-off situation to be optimized in the analysis. Other such trade-offs emerge from the 
fact that the methodology is not identical for the two surveys. All these problems are carefully treated in the 
analysis. 
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3.1.A. Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is in general very difficult to measure and each of its possible 
proxies has its drawbacks. Although the approaches differ from author to author, most of them 
use the share owned by top N investors, where N ranges from three (Claessens et al. 1998) to 
twenty (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). This conventional measure, however, is not perfect because 
it does not take into account the distribution of the top N investors. Therefore, there have been 
developed some alternative proxies such as the Herfindahl index
40 (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, 
Makhija and Spiro 2000) or ‘relative importance’ (Mejstřík et al. 1997) calculated as the ratio 
of the share of top N investors to the sum of the shares of K largest owners
41. These measures 
do consider the distribution of the largest shareholders but, on the other hand, they do not 
sufficiently reflect the total power of these top investors in the company. 
Before defining the measure of ownership concentration used in this paper, the 
following has to be said about the data under examination. Variables describing ownership 
structure are reported for four dates, different for different companies. Let this paper denote 
these dates as A, B, C and D. Date A is the date of the first shareholders’ meeting after 
privatization (ranging from 1991 to 1995, most frequently 1993), date B is the date of the first 
shareholders’ meeting with more than 50% of the shares in private hands (mostly coinciding 
with the previous date), date C is the date of the interview within the first survey (ranging 
from 1994 to 1996, most frequently 1996) and date D is 1998. The values of the ownership 
variables for the date D are obtained from the second survey. 
The measure of ownership concentration used in this paper is close to the conventional 
one, but not the same. Due to the limitations imposed by the character of the data, the measure 
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40  See the definition of the Herfindahl index in the Section 2.2, footnote 35. 
41  In Mejstřík et al. (1997), K = 18 and N alternates between 1 and 5. 
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of ownership concentration in the hands of private outside shareholders, CONC, is defined as 
follows. For dates A, B and C, it is computed as: 
CONC = TOP4bank + TOP4firm + TOP4if + TOP4ind + TOP4for, 
where “TOP4...” denotes the share concentrated in the property of 4 largest shareholders of 
the respective identity – domestic bank, domestic non-financial firm, investment fund, 
individual, and foreign entity. In fact, in a vast majority of companies, the TOP4 variable for 
other groups than investment funds is zero (especially for the dates A and B)
42, implying that 
CONC often coincides with TOP4if.  
For date D, i.e. for 1998, this measure is not available because of the change in the 
methodology between the two surveys. Therefore, for this date, it is replaced by: 
CONC = TOP6outblock, 
i.e. the share concentrated in the hands of 6 largest private outside blockholders (defined as 
shareholders with share above 5%). 
Since this procedure can deliver the values of the concentration measure for at most four 
different dates for each company and the examined period contains eight years, there remain 
many observations for which the values of this measure are missing. Moreover, dates A and B 
often coincide and the data describing ownership are not complete. Thus, in order to fill the 
gaps, the paper employs following imputations of the missing values: 
1) CONC = 0 for all years prior to date A. This naturally assumes that there were no 
private outside owners before privatization (see Table 3, 1991-1992). 
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42  At the date A, as well as at the date B, TOP4bank is positive in 3 companies, TOP4firm in none, TOP4ind in 
4 and TOP4for in 3 companies. At the date C, the numbers are 5, 15, 8 and 5, respectively. 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
2) CONC is linearly interpolated in each interval of missing values between two years 
for which the values are known. This does not concern the cases when the left margin of the 
interval is zero obtained by the first imputation (see Table 3, 1996-1997). 
3) If only one margin of an interval of missing values is known and the other is not, 
CONC equals the known margin in the whole interval, including the other margin (see Table 
3, 1993-1994). 
4) If the value is missing for all the four dates, it is taken as missing in all periods for 
that company, i.e. the first imputation which assigns zero to all dates before date A is not 
applied. The number of such companies is 6, thus 84 complete time series of CONC are 
obtained. 
 Table 3: Illustration of the Missing Values’ Imputation 
3.1.B. Restructuring 
Restructuring is a complex process of transformation of the former state-owned 
enterprises to ‘normally functioning’ firms able to compete in the newly emerging market 
economy. As such it is hard to measure and one has always to be careful when drawing 
conclusions about restructuring from the results obtained for its proxy, no matter how 
comprehensive the proxy is. This paper approximates restructuring by the most conventional 
measure – labor productivity defined as real revenues per employee.
43 Another often used 
variable, measuring rather firm’s value than restructuring, is Tobin’s Q (Claessens et al. 1997; 
Makhija and Spiro 2000). The applicability of any ‘market price’ related measure is, however, 
questionable in the context of the insufficient transparency and liquidity of the capital market. 
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43  The definition of labor productivity in Claessens et al. (1998) is defined as value added per employee. 
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Problems stemming from the institutional drawbacks accompany also accounting measures 
such as profits. 
Some authors try to develop such measure that would comprise all aspects of 
restructuring. One of such attempts can be found in Earle and Estrin (1997) who constructed a 
restructuring index reflecting five dimensions of restructuring – production (described by 4 
indicators), employment (4), firm boundaries (3), compensation (4) and investment (2). The 
drawback of all similar comprehensive indices, however, is that their determination is rather 
arbitrary. Inspired by the approach of Earle and Estrin to the measurement of employment 
restructuring, this paper uses also layoff and turnover ratios as dependent variables, in 
addition to labor productivity. 
The layoff ratio, denoted as LAY, is the ratio of the number of employees laid-off in the 
respective year to the number of all employees in the beginning of that year. The turnover 
ratio, denoted as TURN, is defined as the ratio of the sum of the number of hired employees 
and the number of separated employees in the respective year to the number of all employees 
in the beginning of that year. Earle and Estrin linearly normalized these measures to the 
interval between zero and one. Their main purpose of this was the compatibility with other 
indices of restructuring activities for creating the overall restructuring index. For the purposes 
of this paper, there is no need for normalizing the ratios. 
3.2. Empirical Specification 
The paper employs panel data techniques for estimating four different specifications. 
The dependent variables used to measure restructuring are logarithm of labor productivity 
(LOGLP), layoff ratio (LAY) and turnover ratio (TURN). The simplest specification of the 
model is that assuming linear dependence of the dependent variable on ownership 
concentration.  
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LOGLPt,i = α1 + θ1LOGLPt-1,i  +  β1CONCt,i + γ1(control variables) + ε1i     (1a) 
LAYt,i  (or TURNt,i)  =   α2     +  β2CONCt,i + γ2(control variables) + ε2i     (1b) 
where CONCt,i is the share of the i-th firm owned by top two shareholders at the date t and 
control variables include ownership shares by identity of owners (“SH…”t,i), industry 
dummies (INDi), region dummies (REGi) and size measured as the logarithm of employment 
(LOGEMPt,i). 
This specification does not take into account possible non-linear, not mentioning non-
monotonous, shape of the function. Therefore, it is not sufficient for testing the hypothesis 
from Section 2.3. There can be found three basic methods in the literature how to verify 
similar hypothesis. One of them is to describe ownership concentration through dummies 
referring to respective bands of concentration:   
LOGLPt,i = α1 + θ1LOGLPt-1,i  +  β11D1CONCt,i + ... + β1LDLCONCt,i + γ1(control variables) + ε1i  (2a) 
LAYt,i  (or TURNt,i)  =   α2     +  β21D1CONCt,i + ... + β2LDLCONCt,i + γ2(control variables) + ε2i (2b) 
where D1CONCt,i, ..., DLCONCt,i are L dummies created from CONCt,i for different parts of 
the interval [0; 1] and the residual (L+1)
st band is the reference category. 
Another way of dealing with the non-linear shape is to modify the simple linear 
regression through adding square, and possibly also cube, of the variable CONC: 
LOGLPt,i = α1 + θ1LOGLPt-1,i + β1CONCt,i + β’1(CONCt,i)
2 + β’’1(CONCt,i)
3 + γ1(control. var.) + ε1i  (3a) 
LAYt,i  (or TURNt,i)  =   α2    + β2CONCt,i + β’2(CONCt,i)
2 + β’’2(CONCt,i)
3 + γ2(control var.) + ε2i  (3b) 
This approach – using only the first and the second power – was used by Claessens et 
al. (1998) in order to show a concave shape of the relationship between performance and 
ownership concentration measured by the percentage of shares controlled by the top five 
investors. In this thesis, however, in order to test for possible negative slope of the 
concentration-performance function, the third power has to be included as well. 
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The third possibility is a piece-wise linear regression applied e.g. by Morck et al. (1988) 
or Earle and Estrin (1997). Suppose that the function is expected to be increasing from zero 
concentration to X, decreasing from X to Y, and again increasing after this point. Then the 
estimated equation is: 
LOGLPt,i = α1 + θ1LOGLPt-1,i  +  β1CONC.0toXt,i + β’1CONC.XtoYt,i + β’’1CONC.overYt,i +  
             + γ1(control variables) + ε1i        (4a) 
LAYt,i  (or TURNt,i)  =   α2     +  β2CONC.0toXt,i + β’2CONC.XtoYt,i + β’’2CONC.overYt,i + 
           + γ2(control variables) + ε2i        ( 4 b )  
where the three new variables are defined as: 
CONC.0toX   = CONC   if CONC < X, 
   =  X   if  CONC  ≥ X; 
 
CONC.XtoY  = 0       if CONC < X, 
= CONC minus X  if X ≤ CONC < Y, 
    = Y minus X    if CONC > Y; 
 
CONC.overY  =  0    if  CONC  < Y, 
    = CONC minus Y  if CONC ≥ Y. 
The coefficients β1,  β1’ and β1’’ represent the slopes of the regression line in the 
respective bands. This is the method how Morck et al. reached the conclusions that the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership is positive between 0% and 5%, 
negative between 5% and 25% and slightly positive after that. 
Yet another method which can be used to show the non-linear shape is to divide the 
sample to (possibly three) sub-samples according to the values of CONC, but this would 
significantly weaken the results because the sub-samples would be too small. Therefore, this 
approach is not applied in the following analysis. 
 
  - 44 - 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
3.3. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the character and main properties of the data. It is divided to five 
subsections, whereas the first subsection compares the sample with the population and 
identifies the aspects in which the sample is under- or over-represented. Subsections B, C and 
D describe the data on respective variables and the final subsection prepares the field for the 
following econometric analysis by deriving some statements about the concentration-
restructuring relationship, using basic descriptive statistics. 
3.3.A. Representativity of the Sample 
The comparison of the sample with population might reveal some facts about the sample 
representativity with respect to industry, region and size. As Table 4 shows, the industry of 
machines and equipment is over-represented at the expense of light manufacturing and heavy 
manufacturing which are under-represented in the sample. More than a half of all employees 
in the sample is employed in production of machines and equipment, while in reality this 
industry employs only one third of manufacturing sector employees.  
 Table 4: Population/Sample Comparison by Industry 
In addition to the 81 firms in Table 4, the sample includes 9 non-manufacturing 
companies. These represent 10% of all companies in the sample but only 4.4% when weighted 
by employment. 
Looking at Table 5 one can observe that the sample consists most frequently of 
companies with between 100 and 300 employees. Also companies between 301 and 500 and 
between 501 and 1000 create a large portion. Although the frequencies in the population refer 
to all joint-stock and limited-liability companies, knowing the total number of manufacturing 
companies we can state with certainty that the three highest groups (301-500, 501-1000 and 
above 1000 employees) are over-represented. Firms with more than 1000 employees create at 
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most 8.4% of the manufacturing sector. The respective maximum shares of categories “301-
500” and “501-1000” are 12.0% and 15.7%. The sample is very likely under-representative in 
the companies under 100 employees, however, this cannot be precisely demonstrated on the 
numbers from Table 5. 
 Table 5: Population/Sample Comparison by Size 
3.3.B. Labor Productivity, Employment, Layoff and Turnover Ratio 
As was already mentioned in the section 3.1.B, this paper defines labor productivity as 
the ratio of real revenues and employment. Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the levels 
of employment at the ends of the years, real values of revenues and labor productivity. For 
illustration, the development of the three variables is depicted in Graph 1. 
 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Employment, Real Revenues and Labor Productivity 
 Graph 1: Employment, Real Revenues and Labor Productivity in the Sample (Mean) 
The average level of employment in the examined firms was decreasing for the whole 
first decade of transition, except for a small increase between 1993 and 1994. The average 
level of employment in 1989 was almost 1,500. In 1993, it was already halved and by 1998, it 
had fallen to 503 employees.  
The real value of revenues
44 also dropped by two thirds during the first ten years of 
transition but in a different way. After a slight increase in 1990, they contracted by one third 
each of the two following years. After 1992 the negative trend slowed down and reversed only 
after the average real revenue reached CZK 400 million in 1996. In 1998, the value was 
437 million.  
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Labor productivity dropped by 42 percent during the first three years of transition. 
Since the end of 1992, it had been increasing by 1996 on average by 3.5 percent per year. 
Afterwards, the growth accelerated to 9 percent in 1997 and 38 percent in 1998 when the 
average labor productivity exceeded the 1989 level. 
For comparison with the labor productivity in the population see Graph 2. This graph 
illustrates that while the overall labor productivity of the manufacturing sector decreased in 
1993, the sample mean of this variable rose. After 1993, when the labor productivity of the 
population started growing, that of the companies in the sample was increasing in lower pace. 
This is likely the result of the over-representation of larger enterprises, which are in general 
harder to restructure and their performance is less sensitive to any kind of changes. 
 Graph 2: Labor Productivity in the Czech Manufacturing Sector in 1992-1996 
Table 7 shows the development of the layoff and turnover ratios. It can be observed 
that the average ratio of layoffs per 1,000 employees decreased from 78 in 1991 to 46 in 1994, 
in the following year it jumped to 80 and afterwards it had been constantly increasing until 
1998 when it reached 128. The turnover ratio also decreased between 1991 and 1994, but only 
slightly – from 0.38 to 0.36. In 1995 it jumped to 0.44 and afterwards slightly fell again to 
0.39 in 1998. These numbers suggest significantly higher level of employment restructuring 
after 1994 when the major part of privatization had been over but they might be biased 
because there are more observations available for the first four years than for the period after 
1994. 
 Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Layoff and Turnover Ratios  
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3.3.C. Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure is described by ownership concentration (CONC), which 
represents the primary concern of this paper, and by the identity of owners (“SH…”) which 
enters the vector of control variables. Table 8 presents summary statistics for the imputed 
values of CONC. Panel A of the table shows that the average private outside ownership 
concentration was steadily increasing from 1.7% in 1991 to 66% in 1998. But these numbers 
do not reflect only the process of the concentration of ownership but also the process of 
privatization as such. The means and standard deviations in Panel B are computed only from 
those observations where CONC is strictly positive, thus it shows solely the process of the 
concentration of property rights in the hands of private outsiders. Even these numbers show 
that the average concentration was steadily rising from 37% in 1993 to 67% in 1998. This 
reflects the so-called ‘third wave of privatization’ which was expected to proceed 
spontaneously after the initial distribution of the formerly state-owned property.
45
 Table 8: Process of Ownership Concentration 
The ownership structure by identity is described in the data source by a set of variables 
reporting how large share of the company is in the hands of different types of owners. Table 9 
shows how the variables are nested. Some of these variables (called so far “SH…”) are used 
in the regressions as controls. These are SHSTATE, SHINS and SHFOR reporting the shares 
owned by state, insiders and foreigners, respectively. For the dates A, B and C, SHSTATE is 
defined as the sum of the shares owned by National Property Fund, Restitution Fund, 
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45    This expectation of the spontaneous process of ownership concentration was generally shared but the 
architects of voucher privatization went further and, based on this expectation, they argued that it does not 
matter who the first private owners would be because the best owners would be then determined by market 
forces. However, due to the lack of complementary institutional framework, which would fairly define the 
‘rules of the game’, it really mattered who the first owners (or actually agents of owners in the case of IPFs) 
were. In terms of the Coase Theorem, it can be said that the architects of voucher privatization assumed zero 
or low transaction costs and did not realize that the a well functioning legal and regulatory framework 
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ministries, local governments and other state bodies, SHINS as the sum of the shares owned 
by managers and other employees, and SHFOR as the share owned by foreign investors. At 
the date D, however, these three variables are directly reported in the data set as SSH98, 
ISH98 and FORSH98. 
 Table 9: Variables Describing Ownership by Identity 
The following Table illustrates the level of the completeness of observations for the 
three ownership identity variables.  
 Table 10: Observations of SHSTATE, SHINS, SHFOR in the Four Dates 
The number of valid observations ranges from 52 to 67 for SHSTATE, from 53 to 58 in 
the case of SHINS and from 58 to 69 for SHFOR. The values of SHSTATE are strictly 
positive in 42 companies at the dates A and B, in 27 companies at the date C and in 15 
companies at the date D. As for SHINS, there are 19 strictly positive values for the dates A 
and B, 15 for the date C and 14 for the date D. The respective numbers for SHFOR are only 5, 
8 and 15. 
Some features of the development of the ownership structure can be inferred from Table 
11. On average, 40% share of each company immediately after privatization was in the hands 
of IPFs. Individuals had on average 25% share, the state 17% and insiders 9% while the other 
types of owners were substantially less represented in the immediate post-privatization 
ownership structure. In 1998, i.e. four or five years after privatization in many cases, IPFs 
already owned only 0.2% share on average because many of them transformed to other 
financial institutions, mostly financial holdings (see Section 1.4) and some IPFs sold their 
shares, usually to domestic non-financial firms which had become the most important owners 
with 38% share on average. The direct role of the state in the ownership structures had almost 
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constitutes a necessary condition for this assumption to hold. The ex-post regulation approach (see Section 
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disapeared (from 17 to 3% share on average, see also Graph 3). The indirect influence that the 
state maintained after privatization through IPFs established by state-owned banks had 
withered away as well, because banks and IPFs altogether owned only 1.1% share on average. 
The last two points to be mentioned here are that insiders’ average share had almost halved to 
5% and that of foreign investors had more than tripled to 9%.  
 Table 11: Shares by Identity at the Dates A and D 
 Graph 3: Histogram of the State’s Shares: Date A vs. Date D – Individual Samples 
In order not to lose many observations, four imputations analogous to those used for 
ownership concentration (see Section 3.1.A) are done for these three variables, with the only 
exception that in the first imputation for SHSTATE, value 1 (instead of 0) is imputed prior to 
date A. The number of the companies where the values of SHSTATE are missing for all dates 
is 21. Thus 69 complete time series of this variable are obtained by the imputation. For 
SHINS, there are only 13 companies for which the observations are missing at all the dates, 
which implies 77 complete series of SHINS. Finally, the number of the companies where the 
values of SHFOR are missing for all dates is 20. Thus 70 complete time series of this variable 
are obtained by the imputation. 
Table 12 presents summary statistics of these three variables after the imputations for 
each of the eight years under examination. According to this table, SHSTATE declined on 
average to 12% in 1993, than increased to 20% in 1995 and afterwards fell to 6% in 1998. The 
average SHINS increased from 1% in 1991 to 7% in 1995 and then slightly declined to 5% in 
1998. SHFOR slowly but steadily grew from zero in 1991 to 3% in 1997 and then jumped to 
10% in 1998. Though the comparison of these numbers with those reported in the previous 
table makes it indisputable that the imputations to some extent distort the real picture, the 
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1.4), thus implied high transaction costs and made the identity of the first private owners matter. 
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additional information obtained by the inclusion of the imputed observations outweighs this 
drawback. 
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 Table 12: Summary Statistics of SHSTATE, SHINS and SHFOR after Imputations 
3.3.D. Control Variables 
As was mentioned in the Section 3.2., the vector of control variables includes 
(1)  ownership shares by identity of owners, (2) size measured as the logarithm of 
employment, (3) industry dummies and (4) region dummies. The data on ownership and size 
have been already described in the previous two sections. The last two groups of variables that 
remain yet to be described are industry and region dummies. 
The companies are categorized by industry to three groups – food and light industry, 
used together as the reference base, heavy industry and machinery (IND_HM), and other 
industries (IND_OTHER). Out of the 90 companies, 29 (32%) are in the food and light 
industry, 52 (58%) in the heavy industry and machinery, and 9 (10%) in other industries. 
Regionally, the companies are divided to those in Prague (the base), others in Bohemia 
(REGBOH), and those in Moravia and Silesia (REGMOR). In the sample, 10 companies 
(11%) are located in Prague, there are 43 (48%) other Bohemian companies, and 37 (41%) 
firms are located in Moravia or Silesia. Industry and region dummies are reported in the data 
set for all observations. 
3.3.E. Concentration-Restructuring Relationship
The last step of this section, and necessary step to be made before moving to the 
regression analysis, is to show what can be inferred about the concentration-restructuring 
relationship on the basis of descriptive statistics. This consists in dividing the sample to 11 
sub-samples according to the level of concentration (CONC=0, 0<CONC≤0.1,…, 
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0.9<CONC<1, CONC=1) and computing summary statistics for the dependent variables in 
these bands. This is done in Table 13 and Graph 4. 
 Table 13: Summary Statistics of LOGLP, LAY and TURN (Conditional on CONC) 
 Graph 4: Plot of CONC and the Conditional Mean of LOGLP, LAY and TURN 
The values of LOGLP in the Table 13, as plotted in Graph 4, increase in the interval 
(0.0; 0.4], decrease in (0.4; 0.6], then increase again in (0.6; 0.9] and fall afterwards. Although 
the values do not vary much, they are consistent with the hypothesis from the Section 2.3, 
except for the decrease in the last 10% band. The other two restructuring measures, on the 
other hand, do not show any remarkable association with ownership concentration. 
To sum up, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 13 and illustrated in the Graph 4 
partly confirm the hypothesis of this paper and justify the attempt to test the hypothesis 
econometrically, using  labor productivity as the proxy for restructuring. At the same time, 
however, they suggest that neither the layoff ratio nor the turnover ratio is related to the level 
of private outside ownership concentration. Therefore, in the following econometric analysis, 
the main focus is on labor productivity as the dependent variable, while the two ratios are 
touched only marginally. 
3.4. Estimation Results 
After the problems of measuring ownership concentration and restructuring have been 
discussed, the alternative econometric specifications accounting for the possible attenuation or 
even negativity of the concentration-performance relationship between certain margins have 
been presented, and the data was carefully described, let the paper report and interpret proper 
estimates. All the specifications for the unbalanced panel were estimated by all OLS, fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) procedures (using company as the stratification 
variable). However, very low LM statistics favor the OLS estimates over the others in a vast 
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majority of the final specifications. Moreover the FE and RE estimations mostly give 
insignificant results, which might be attributed to the large loss of the degrees of freedom 
when 90 company effects are added. Therefore the results of the FE and RE models are often 
not reported. The estimations for labor productivity as the dependent variable come first 
(specifications denoted with the index ‘a’ in the Section 3.2), while the layoff and turnover 
ratios’ regressions (‘b’-specifications) are discussed only afterwards and to a lesser extent. 
The first set of estimations is the one concerning the basic linear specification (1a). 
3.4.A. Linear Concentration-Productivity Relationship 
Table 14 presents the estimates of three different versions of the specification (1a) 
which differ in the identity of the owners they take into account as control variables “SH…”. 
Specification 1a.1 includes the share owned by the state and the share owned by insiders, 
while specification 1a.2 considers only the former and specification 1a.3 only the latter. All 
the three equations were estimated both with and without the industry and region dummies, 
whereas the estimations without these covariates were done by OLS, FE and RE. However, 
only OLS results are presented for the reasons explained above.  
 Table 14: Estimation Results – Specification 1a 
The first thing to be observed from the results is that all estimated slopes for SHSTATE 
are negative, while all SHINS and CONC coefficients are positive. However, not all the 
ownership-related estimates are significant. Estimations 1a.1 and 1a.2 give non-significant 
slopes for all ownership variables except for SHSTATE when estimated without industry and 
region dummies. The coefficient is negative (as expected) and significant at 10 percent level 
in both cases, being slightly higher in its magnitude when SHINS is included in the 
regression. According to these results, one percent increase of the state’s share means ceteris 
paribus decrease of LOGLP by approximately 0.0015. 
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The coefficient for private outside ownership concentration becomes significant at one 
percent level, having the value of 0.331 and 0.344 for the specifications with and without 
covariates respectively, when SHSTATE is left out from the equation and only SHINS 
remains as ownership covariate (specification 1a.3). The coefficient for SHINS is positive but 
insignificant when industry and region dummies are included but it is 10% significant and 
positive when the dummies are left out, suggesting that 1% increase of the insiders’ share 
causes ceteris paribus 0.0026 increase in log labor productivity. There were performed also 
other regressions with SHFOR, besides SHINS and SHSTATE. All these estimations again 
deliver negative slopes for SHSTATE and positive for SHINS and CONC but they are 
insignificant. The estimates of SHFOR coefficients are the most insignificant, varying 
between slightly negative and slightly positive values. 
To sum up, there was found an empirical support for a slightly positive relationship 
between private outside ownership concentration and labor productivity, but this evidence is 
rather weak as the magnitudes and standard errors of the estimates are sensitive to the changes 
of the use of industry, region and ownership covariates. This might mean that there exists 
some kind of positive, though not linear, relationship between concentration and productivity, 
which opens the space for examining the three alternative specifications. 
3.4.B. Nonlinear Concentration-Productivity Relationship 
The first of the three alternatives is the specification (2a) which uses dummies of 
ownership concentration. Based on the Table 13 from the Section 3.3.E, the concentration is 
divided to six bands with borders at 20%, 30%, 40%, 70% and 90% concentration. Thus five 
dummies are created: CONC_0020, CONC_2030, CONC_3040, CONC_4070 and 
CONC_7090 with the band between 90% and 100% concentration being the omitted category. 
Out of the three models – using SHSTATE or SHINS or both ownership identity variables as 
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controls – the first does not give any significant estimates of the dummies’ coefficients. The 
results of the model using both controls (specification 2a.1) and those of the model using 
only SHINS (specification 2a.2) are presented in Table 15. For the former, only OLS 
estimates are reported because an extremely low LM statistic unambiguously favors OLS over 
FE and RE. For the latter, this is not the case any more, therefore all the three results are 
reported. 
 Table 15: Estimation Results – Specification 2a 
In both estimations of the specification 2a.1, the coefficient of SHSTATE is negative 
and significant at 5% level, while the SHINS slope is positive but insignificant. The SHINS 
coefficient is also positive in all the four estimations of the specification 2a.2, while only the 
OLS (without covariates) and RE estimates are significant at 10% level. All estimates for the 
dummies are negative while they are all significant in three out of the six estimations. The 
most significant results (all dummies significant at most at 5%) and also the highest R-squared 
adjusted are obtained by FE estimation of 2a.2 which assigns the lowest intercept to 
companies with concentration between 20 and 30%. However, the Wald test shows that the 
coefficients for the first three dummies are not significantly different from each other. The 
mutual comparison of the first four dummies varies throughout the estimations. The only clear 
thing that the specifications with dummies show is that the firms with ownership 
concentration above 90% tend to have, other things being the same, the highest labor 
productivity, followed by companies with 70 to 90% concentration. Thus the concentration-
productivity function can be said to be increasing between 70 and 100% concentration. Below 
the point of 70%, the model does not reveal any systematic relationship between 
concentration and productivity. 
The second way to examine the non-linear relationship is to modify the basic linear 
specification (1a) by adding CONC-squared and CONC-cubed following the approach of 
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Claessens  et al. (1998). Thus the specification 3a is obtained. The problem of this 
specification, that can be recognized at the first glance, is that of multicolinearity which can 
inflate the standard errors. Multicollinearity is indeed very high – 94% correlation between 
CONC and CONC-sq., 86% between CONC and CONC-cub. and 98% (!) between CONC-sq. 
and CONC-cub. – and it might make even the statistically significant coefficients seem 
insignificant. Nevertheless, there can be found one version of this specification which yields 
10% significant estimates of β1, β1 ’ and β1’’ (Table 16). In this specification, the vector of 
control variables includes two industry dummies (‘heavy industry and machinery’ and ‘other 
idustries’ with the reference group ‘light and food industry’), one region dummy (‘Moravia 
and Silesia’ with the reference group Bohemia) and two ownership identity variables 
(‘insiders’ and ‘foreigners’ with the omitted category ‘state and private domestic outsiders’). 
The shape of the relationship indicated by the results is exactly the one suggested in the 
hypothesis in the Section 2.3. It even corresponds with the strong form of the hypothesis as 
the slope of the concentration-productivity function is negative (though very close to zero) for 
the levels of ownership concentration between 31.5% and 58.3%, and positive otherwise
46. In 
the other versions of the specification 3a, the estimates are not significant but in most cases 
they are positive for the first and the third power of CONC and negative for CONC-squared 
suggesting again the hypothesized shape. 
 Table 16: Estimation Results – Specification 3a 
The third alternative is linear piece-wise regression described by the specification (4a) 
in the Section 3.2. The first step to be done within this procedure is to decide how to divide 
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the unit interval of ownership concentration to bands. A natural way how to determine the 
dividing points is to depart from the results of the estimation 3a, according to which the 
concentration-productivity function is increasing before 30% and after 60%, while it is 
slightly decreasing between these two margins. Thus ownership concentration can enter the 
model by three variables: CONC.0to30, CONC.30to60, and CONC.over60. These variables 
(generally defined at the end of the Section 3.2) were created, and then LOGLP was regressed 
on  them and different sets of control variables. The results are reported in Table 17. Again, 
only OLS estimates are presented because the LM statistics are almost zero. 
 Table 17: Estimation Results – Specification 4a 
The estimations using SHSTATE together with SHINS (specification 4a.1) or solely 
SHSTATE (specification 4a.2) as ownership identity controls show negative (but almost 
zero) relationship between concentration and productivity in the first band, slightly positive in 
the middle band and more positive in the third band. But none of the coefficients is 
significant. The coefficient for CONC.over60 becomes significant when the sole ownership 
control is SHINS (specification 4a.3). In both versions of this specification (with and without 
covariates), the t-statistics for CONC.0to30 are substantially higher than in the previous two 
estimations – making the slopes almost significant at 10% level – and the coefficients for this 
variable are positive. The slope in the middle band is very close to zero and, indeed, less 
significantly different from zero than in the estimations 4a.1 and 4a.2. Thus, specification 
4a.3 shows the shape suggested in the hypothesis.
47 Similarly to the specification with 
dummies, the only sound conclusion that can be drawn from all the versions of the linear 
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CONC.0to40, CONC.40to60, CONC.60to85 and CONC.over85. The results of these regressions, however, 
were of lower information value. Therefore, they are not discussed here. 
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piece-wise regression is that the function is increasing above 60% concentration. The 
relationship between ownership concentration and labor productivity in the interval of 
concentration from zero to sixty percent is again unclear. 
The main result of the three alternative estimations reported in this section is that there 
is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and labor productivity function 
when the concentration is high, i.e. at over approximately 60%. Under this margin, the sign of 
the relationship is uncertain. Thus the estimated relationship fits the hypothesis in the high 
and moderate bands of concentration. However, the expected positive slope of the function for 
the lowest values of concentration was not confirmed. This might either mean that the level X 
in the hypothesis is very close to zero or simply that the hypothesis was wrong in predicting 
the shape of the function for low concentration. 
Another view on these results could consider the quality of the proxy used for 
ownership concentration, which does not take into consideration the distribution of the shares 
in the group of the largest shareholders. How good the variable CONC is? While high values 
of CONC can be without much doubt interpreted as representing high concentration, when the 
value of CONC is moderate or low, the information value of this variable becomes 
questionable. This might be the reason why the only clear inference about the concentration-
restructuring relationship concerns only high values of concentration.  
3.4.C. Estimations with Instrumental Variables 
The hitherto analysis assumed that ownership concentration is exogenous with respect 
to other explanatory variables. It is, however, very likely that the process of the concentration 
of ownership structures after privatization was dependent on several company-related 
characteristics, such as size, industry or region. To account for the possible selection bias, 
 
  - 58 - 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
ownership concentration should be instrumented and two-step procedure should be used to 
estimate the concentration-productivity function. 
When looking for suitable instruments one might consider three groups of variables that 
can affect ownership concentration. The first group consists of the company characteristics 
used in the specifications. These are size, industry dummies and region dummies. Size is 
measured by the logarithm of employment in the beginning of the respective year and it is 
expected to have negative effect, as the ownership structures in larger companies are more 
likely to become less concentrated. Industry is now characterized by five groups – light 
industry, food industry, heavy industry, machinery, and other industries – where machinery is 
taken as the omitted category and the others are represented by four dummies. Regionally, the 
sample is divided to companies in Bohemia (REGMOR=0) and those in Moravia and Silesia 
(REGMOR=1). 
The second group of the suggested determinants of concentration includes lagged 
variables referring to observable performance or achieved restructuring. These are the return 
on assets calculated as the ratio of gross profit and production assets (ROA t-1), exports to non-
former CMEA countries as a percentage of total revenue (EXP t-1), the layoff ratio (LAY t-1) 
and the turnover ratio (TURN t-1). The values of EXP are reported in the data source only for 
years 1989, 1994 and 1998. Therefore the values for the other years are imputed by linear 
interpolation. In this case, as opposed to that of ownership variables (see the Section 3.1.A), 
the interpolation between two valid observations is the only imputation. This means that 
when, for instance, the value for 1989 is missing and 1994 and 1998 are not, only the values 
of 1995, 1996 and 1997 are imputed while those before 1994 remain missing. All the four 
variables from this group are expected to have positive effect on ownership concentration as 
their high values signal better perspectives of the firm and thus attract investors. 
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The third group of the suggested instruments describes cost structure in 1992. The 
choice of this year is motivated by the character of the data set which provides many 
observations of variables describing cost structure in 1992 but much lower number of valid 
observations for other years. These variables are personnel costs (CPER92), material costs 
(CMAT92) and depreciation (CDEP92), all measured as a percentage of total costs in 1992. 
Table 18 presents the results of the OLS regressions of CONC on the variables 
discussed above. The best specification found (see Estimation C in Table 18) includes size, 
dummy for Moravia and Silesia, lagged return on assets, lagged export, lagged layoff ratio 
and the share of personnel costs in 1992. The estimates of the coefficients of all these 
instruments are significant at most at 5% level and they all have the expected signs. The effect 
of the other variables on ownership concentration is insignificant. The fitted values obtained 
by this regression range from 0.13 to 0.95. A large problem of this estimation is that it is 
based only on 173 observations. This drawback, however, cannot be removed by other 
imputations because in the vast majority of the cases of missing observations, the observations 
are not available for any year for the respective company. 
 Table 18: Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
Now, after the identification of the instruments, the two-step regressions can be run for 
two out of the four specifications examined in the previous chapter, i.e. for those where 
concentration enters as a continuous variable. These are the basic linear regression and the 
‘polynomial’ regression estimated by OLS procedure as the low levels of LM statistics again 
favor it over FE and RE. The IV estimation of the specifications 1a.1, 1a.2 and 1a.3 give 
slightly negative but insignificant slopes for concentration. The signs of the coefficients for 
SHSTATE and SHINS are alternating and in all cases insignificant. Thus no linear 
relationship between instrumented CONC and LOGLP is revealed.  
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When the fitted value enters the right-hand side in the linear, squared and cubed forms, 
the obtained results are easy to summarize, though difficult to interpret. Seven versions of this 
regression were performed (all combinations of SHSTATE, SHINS and SHFOR as ownership 
controls), all with and without industry and region dummies and none of the estimates of the 
ownership-describing variables (fitted CONC in the first, second and third powers plus the 
three controls) are significant. The slopes for state’s and foreign shareholding are always 
negative, while those for insiders’ shareholding are always positive. Nor the three 
concentration-related coefficients change their signs when the set of covariates is altered. The 
first and the third power are negative, while the second power is positive. These signs, though 
insignificant, are exactly opposite to the results obtained without instruments. However, as all 
these estimates are insignificant, it can be concluded that the two-step estimation did not show 
any systematic relationship between concentration and restructuring. The difference between 
OLS and IV estimates and the fact that all the ownership variables are estimated to have 
insignificant effect on labor productivity might be attributed to the different, three times 
smaller sample in the IV compared to the OLS regressions. As the fitted value for CONC is 
determined only for 173 observations, the number of observations for the two-step estimations 
varies  from 95 to 134 depending on the inclusion of the ownership identity variables. 
To conclude this subsection, there were found significant instruments for ownership 
concentration but the two-step estimations did not show any systematic relationship between 
ownership concentration and productivity. The large number of missing observations 
combined with the impossibility of using reasonable imputations led to three times smaller 
sample in two-step regressions might be the reason. An alternative explanation could again 
consist in the considerations about the information value of the variable CONC. 
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3.4.D. The Effects of Concentration on the Layoff and Turnover Ratios 
Alternative proxies for restructuring to labor productivity are the layoff ratio and the 
turnover ratio. The summary statistics from the Section 3.3.E did not show any effect of 
ownership concentration on these two measures. Employing the procedures of econometric 
estimation leads to a similar conclusion. When concentration is assumed to be independent 
from other explanatory variables, no significant relationship is found. In a majority of these 
estimations, high values of LM statistics and Hausman tests unambiguously favor FE model. 
No version of the four specifications (1b, 2b, 3b and 4b) gives significant coefficients for 
concentration (the slopes oscillate around zero). The only ownership variable that has a 
statistically significant effect is SHSTATE with always positive and almost always significant 
effect on LAY and SHINS with always positive and almost always significant effect on 
TURN. 
The same can be said about the estimations using instrumental variables, with the only 
exception – coefficients for SHSTATE and SHINS are always insignificant. When LAY is 
regressed, the sign of SHSTATE slope is alternating and that of SHINS is always positive. 
When the dependent variable is TURN, the signs of both the ownership-identity coefficients 
are positive in almost all specifications. No such pattern, which is observed for the 
insignificant coefficients of ownership identity, can be observed for concentration. 
To sum up, no systematic association with ownership concentration has been found for 
any of the two ratios. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the dependence of firm restructuring on 
private outside ownership concentration in the Czech manufacturing sector after privatization. 
This examination has been done in three steps. The first chapter presented the main features of 
the post-privatization ownership structures. Departing from the so-called privatization tree 
constructed from various sources the chapter argued that the main actors in these structures 
were investment privatization funds and it carefully described the design of these new 
financial institutions. It also contended that another very important actor was the state, which 
still retained substantial control through both direct and indirect ownership. The state’s ex-
post regulation approach and the continuous postponement of the reform of the enforcement 
system enhanced the separation of ownership and control and thus gave large powers to the 
largest owners or their representatives on the company boards.  
In the Chapter 2, the theoretical hypothesis about the examined relationship was 
derived. Building on the hitherto achievements of the ‘general’ and ‘transition’ debates on the 
ownership-performance relationship, in particular on the contribution of Morck et al. (1988), 
and realizing the above mentioned specialties of the Czech case, the paper assumes that 
ownership concentration affects restructuring through four different effects – that of incentive 
alignment, that of the entrenchment of managers, that of the entrenchment of the new owners 
in control and, finally, that of tunneling opportunities for these owners. The hypothesis, 
constructed from these assumptions, states in its weak form that the concentration-
restructuring function in the post-privatization Czech environment is increasing in the whole 
domain with an attenuated slope in a certain part of it, while the strong form states that the 
function is increasing before a certain level of concentration, afterwards it is decreasing and, 
finally, as the concentration gets closer to 100%, the function is increasing again.  
 
  - 63 - 
   Ondřej Vychodil    Ownership Concentration and Restructuring in Czech Manufacturing Sector 
The last step was to test this hypothesis on the sample of 90 companies in the period 
1991-1998. Restructuring, approximated by labor productivity (in logarithm), was regressed 
on private outside ownership concentration, measured by the share of the largest N private 
outside investors where N as well as some other properties of the measure are different for 
different years. The use of these imprecise proxies, especially that for ownership 
concentration, represents the first weakness of the empirical analysis. Another limitation of 
the estimations is caused by the imputations of ownership variables (and exports used as 
instruments) made in order to, at least partly, eliminate the problem of missing observations. 
Furthermore, the observations for the dependent variables, size and instrument variables, are 
incomplete.  
Despite the limitations listed above, the OLS, FE and RE regressions partly confirmed 
the hypothesis, especially the expected shape of the function for high and moderate 
concentration. However, no significant specification was found when instrumental variables 
were used to remove possible selection bias. Neither OLS, FE and RE, nor IV estimations 
showed a significant systematic relationship between private outside ownership concentration 
and the layoff and turnover ratios. Finally, the results in general report a negative effect of the 
state’s shareholding and a positive effect of insiders’ shareholding on restructuring. 
The main contribution of this paper consists in the fact that it analyzed the costs as well 
as the benefits of ownership concentration. Furthermore, it did not attempt to generalize the 
shape of the concentration-performance function but, on the contrary, it used some specific 
features of the Czech environment to derive the shape. Although the empirical results are 
rather weak, they do suggest that not only the benefits but also the costs of concentration were 
present in the Czech Republic of the 1990’s. There is still a large space for further empirical 
research on the importance of the concentration of property rights in the Czech Republic and 
in transition economies in general. A better understanding of the issue of ownership 
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concentration would undoubtedly help in designing and fostering the mechanisms of 
corporate governance. More generally, it might help some to finally realize the crucial 
importance of legal order and the system of its enforcement. 
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Table 1  Czech Privatization in Numbers – Mass Privatization Tree 
STATE-OWNED    Restitutions: 200
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS:  Privatized before  Municipalization: 350
Approximately   Large-scale Privatization:       730  Transformation of co-operatives:  150
1930 bn. Crowns    Small Privatization:  30
  
 
          IPFs:          153  14 ICs:          117.8 
     Voucher Privatization  Vouchers: 212.5    Other IPFs:     35.2 
             (1
st wave, 1991-93):         374.5*  Individuals: 59.5
        State:          75*     
    Joint Stock    Other:         60*     
  Approved for  Companies:               754.3      IPFs:           98.5  14 ICs:            61.1 
      Privatization Voucher Privatization  Vouchers:  155    Other IPFs:     37.4 
Large-scale  And transferred           871.6    (2
nd wave, 1993-94):   200-250*    Individuals: 59.5   
Privatization:  From MF to NPF 
(Dec/30/1993) 
      State   
& other:    45-95* 
      Other:                          150-200*       
1200*      Public auctions:                   5.8       
    Standard methods:      81.3  Public tenders:                   19.2       
      Direct sales:                       46.3       
    Gratuitous transfers:     30         
    Restitutions:                  16         
  State:                            300*           
  Liquidated:                    30*           
Note: The numbers (billions of crowns) refer to the book value of the assets privatized through the respective methods. 
* denotes a roughly approximated number which can differ maximum 10% up or down from its value. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, National Property Fund, Mejstřík (1993), Mládek (1994), Kočenda (1999), author’s calculations. 
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Table 2  The Concentration of Ownership by Funds after Voucher Privatization 
 Relative  importance
*) over 50% Relative  importance
*) over 30% 
 Number  of 
companies 




% out of the sample of 
949 companies 
1  largest  fund  146 15,4 442 46,6 
2  largest  funds  473 49,8 782 82,4 
3  largest  funds  669 70,5 847 89,3 
4  largest  funds  727 76,6 860 90,6 
5  largest  funds  754 79,5 867 91,4 
*) Relative importance k = share k / sum of 18 significant stocks of shares, where the 18 stocks represent 8 largest 
non-voucher investors (foreign and domestic investors, National Property Fund) and 10 largest voucher investors 
(IPFs).  
Source: Mejstřík, Marcinčin, Laštovička (1997). 
 
 
Table 3  Illustration of the Missing Values’ Imputation 
Date (A,B,C,D)      A=B    C      D 
Year  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 
Values before imputation  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.45  NA  NA  0.6 
Values after imputation  0  0  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.5  0.55  0.6 
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Table 4  Population/Sample Comparison by Industry 
  Population (Czech Republic, 1995)  Sample 
 
Industry 
No. of companies 











Food, beverages, tobacco  560 15.9  10.5  15  18.5  8.2 
Light manufacturing  1103  31.3  23.9  14  17.3  14.2 
Heavy manufacturing  960  27.3  32.3  17  21.0  22.5 
Machines and equipment  899  25.5  33.4  35  43.2  55.2 
Manufacturing total  3522  100.0  100.0  81  100.0  100.0 
Source for population data: Goerojo and Earle (1999), Czech Statistical Office (1996). The weight in population 
statistics was the average number of employees in December 1995. The weight in sample statistics was 
employment at the end of the year 1995 – in the case of non-availability of this value, the level of employment 
for the closest available year is used. 
 
 
Table 5  Population/Sample Comparison by Size 
  Population (Czech Republic, 1995) – all sectors                     Sample 
Industry  No. of JSCs and LTDs  Percent  No. of JSCs and LTDs  Percent 
Less than 100  101,250  96.4  2  2.2 
100 – 300  2,462  2.3  28  31.1 
301 – 500  553  0.5  25  27.8 
501 – 1000  422  0.4  20  22.2 
More than 1000  296  0.3  15  16.7 
Total 104,983  100.0  90  100.0 
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Table 6  Descriptive Statistics for Employment, Real Revenues and Labor Productivity 
 (Mean;  Standard deviation in italics; number of valid observations) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996  1997 1998
Employment  1 467.6  1 318.4  1 004.9 891.2 790.8 745.0 787.9  692.2  579.4 503.3
EMP (employees)  1 554.3  1 376.1  1 136.0 1 080.3 990.5 1 027.6 1 106.4  993.0  895.8 772.5
  65 70 81 89 89 84 66  66  66 65
Real revenues  1 332 782  1 402 852  913 048 647 569 545 287 518 568 492 379  400 681  407 937 436 634
RREV (thous. CZK)  1 605 015  1 639 338  1 150 074 1 043 652 799 942 890 672 667 487  457 306  497 210 536 527
  47 50 57 75 78 75 59  59  59 52
Labor productivity  1 277.1  1 248.6  920.5 742.9 766.1 784.3 842.0  862.6  940.3 1 296.7
LP = RREV / EMP  1 701.8  1 550.1  974.9 793.0 754.5 654.4 749.4  721.9  836.6 1 368.3
  41 45 53 74 77 73 54  55  55 50
 
Graph 1  Employment, Real Revenues and Labor Productivity in the Sample (Mean) 










































































































































































































































Source: WIIW (1998) 
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Table 7  Descriptive Statistics for the Layoff and Turnover Ratios 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  All 
LAY    - Mean  0.078  0.065  0.061  0.046  0.080  0.106  0.100  0.128  0.791 
            - Std. Dev.  0.098  0.065  0.075  0.061  0.106  0.171  0.098  0.174  0.109 
            - Observations  52  66  70  67  48  45  46  45  439 
TURN  -  Mean  0.380 0.381 0.377 0.361 0.440 0.430 0.408 0.391 0.393 
            - Std. Dev.  0.238  0.232  0.248  0.264  0.290  0.238  0.227  0.222  0.246 
            - Observations  58  73  79  75  53  51  51  50  490 
 
 
Table 8  Process of Ownership Concentration 
A) for all available values of CONC (if CONC ≥ 0) 
CONC  All 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean  0.364  0.018 0.093 0.280 0.327 0.424 0.514 0.592 0.661 
Std.Dev.  0.313  0.121 0.228 0.251 0.251 0.249 0.235 0.221 0.249 
Obs.  672  84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
B) for positive values of CONC (if CONC > 0) 
CONC  All 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean  0.510  0.750 0.457 0.368 0.416 0.451 0.514 0.592 0.670 
Std.Dev.  0.251  0.354 0.306 0.224 0.207 0.231 0.235 0.221 0.239 
Obs.  479  2  17 64 66 79 84 84 83 
 
Table 9  Variables Describing Ownership by Identity 
1) INSIDERS  
... variable SHINS 
2) STATE  
... variable SHSTATE 
3) PRIVATE OUTSIDERS 
     - Managers       - Ministries  A. Domestic banks 
     - Production workers       - National Property Fund       - Largely state-owned banks 
     - Non-production employees       - Restitution Fund       - Privatized banks 
     - Former employees       - Local governments       - Newly established private banks 
     - Work collective ownership       - Other state institutions  B. Domestic non-financial firms 
       - Largely state-owned firms 
         - Cooperatives 
         - Privatized firms 
         - Newly established private firms 
  C. Investment funds 
  D. Domestic individuals 
  E. Foreigners ... variable SHFOR 
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Table 10  Observations of SHSTATE, SHINS, SHFOR in the Four Dates 
    date A  date B  date C  Date D 
SHSTATE    > 0  42  42  27  15 
 =  0  17  17  25  52 
 missing  31  31  38  23 
SHINS    > 0  19  19  15  14 
 =  0  39  39  38  45 
 missing  32  32  37  31 
SHFOR   > 0  5  5  8  14 
 =  0  53  53  51  55 
 missing  32  32  33  21 
 
 
Table 11  Shares by Identity at the Dates A and D 
A) Individual Samples 
Date A: 56 obs.   INS  STATE  FIRM  BANK IF    IND  FOR 
  Mean    0.089 0.174 0.052 0.006 0.396   0.254 0.027 
  Std.  Dev.    0.248 0.181 0.201 0.040 0.262   0.196 0.131 
  Maximum    1  0.765 1  0.299 0.920   0.960 0.743 
  Minimum    0 0 0 0 0   0 0 
Date D: 67 obs.    INS  STATE  FIRM  BANK  IF  FIN  IND  FOR 
  Mean    0.047 0.032 0.377 0.009 0.002 0.220 0.225 0.088 
  Std.  Dev.    0.165 0.114 0.368 0.042 0.008 0.287 0.217 0.243 
  Maximum    0.820 0.760 1  0.210 0.030 0.900 1  1 
  Minimum    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
B) Common Sample (44 obs.)  
Date A   INS  STATE  FIRM  BANK IF    IND  FOR 
  Mean  0.022 0.175 0.068 0.008 0.422   0.271 0.035 
  Std.  Dev.  0.087 0.186 0.227 0.046 0.261   0.204 0.149 
  Maximum  0.57 0.765  1  0.299  0.92   0.96 0.743 
  Minimum  0 0 0 0 0   0 0 
Date D   INS  STATE  FIRM  BANK IF  FIN  IND  FOR 
  Mean    0.043 0.040 0.363 0.014 0.003 0.207 0.252 0.080 
  Std.  Dev.    0.161 0.134 0.367 0.051 0.009 0.281 0.241 0.216 
  Maximum    0.820 0.760 1  0.210 0.030 0.890 1  0.950 
  Minimum    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Date A denotes the date of the first shareholders’ meeting after privatization. Date D denotes 1998. 
In  1998, many investment funds had been already transformed to other financial institutions and also new 
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Graph 3  Histogram of the State’s Shares: Date A vs. Date D – Individual Samples 
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Table 12  Summary Statistics of SHSTATE, SHINS and SHFOR after Imputations 
    1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
SHSTATE  Mean  0.945 0.769 0.120 0.142 0.198 0.179 0.113 0.057 
  Std.Dev.  0.224 0.400 0.181 0.161 0.202 0.225 0.184 0.184 
  Min  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max  1  1  1  0.6  0.8  1  0.765  0.765 
  Obs.  69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
SHINS  Mean  0.013 0.028 0.067 0.069  0.07  0.061 0.062 0.054 
  Std.Dev.  0.114 0.160 0.216 0.218 0.217 0.218 0.221 0.214 
  Min  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Max  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Obs.  77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
SHFOR  Mean  0  0  0.002 0.010 0.014 0.017 0.028 0.104 
  Std.Dev.  0  0  0.015 0.040 0.065 0.072 0.102 0.260 
  Min  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Max  0  0  0.13  0.249 0.469 0.513 0.651  1 
  Obs.  70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
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Table 13  Summary Statistics of LOGLP, LAY and TURN (Conditional on CONC) 
 LOGLP  LAY  TURN 
Band of 
CONC:  Mean 
(Std.D.) 








Min Max Valid 
obs. 
All  6.47 
(0.77) 
1.47 8.73  491  0.079 
(0.109) 
0 0.95 439  0.39 
(0.25) 





1.47 8.73  463  0.082 
(0.111) 
0 0.95 421  0.39 
(0.25) 
0 1.54 472 
CONC = 0  6.39 
(0.86) 
1.47 8.73  141  0.065 
(0.082) 
0 0.36 141  0.40 
(0.27) 
0 1.31 154 
(0.0; 0.1]  6.21 
(0.36) 
5.64 6.79  12  0.098 
(0.077) 
0 0.28 112  0.29 
(0.21) 
0.10 0.81 14 
(0.1; 0.2]  6.34 
(0.73) 
5.09 8.00  32  0.057 
(0.074) 
0 0.36 27  0.41 
(0.21) 
0.14 0.98 31 
(0.2; 0.3]  6.45 
(0.60) 
5.62 8.21  23  0.051 
(0.072) 
0 0.28 27  0.41 
(0.23) 
0.01 0.99 31 
(0.3; 0.4]  6.62 
(0.64) 
5.69 8.43  39  0.080 
(0.160) 
0 0.95 40  0.36 
(0.27) 
0.01 1.54 42 
(0.4; 0.5]  6.56 
(0.79) 
2.88 8.16  64  0.076 
(0.274) 
0 0.53 54  0.38 
(0.27) 
0 1.22 61 
(0.5; 0.6]  6.40 
(0.80) 
4.63 8.24  36  0.115 
(0.112) 
0 0.42 31  0.36 
(0.19) 
0.06 0.89 33 
(0.6; 0.7]  6.49 
(0.92) 
4.72 8.70  40  0.068 
(0.079) 
0 0.34 33  0.38 
(0.20) 
0.04 1.07 36 
(0.7; 0.8]  6.70 
(0.84) 
4.87 8.26  29  0.100 
(0.100) 
0 0.39 21  0.43 
(0.18) 
0.08 0.78 28 
(0.8; 0.9]  6.82 
(0.78) 
4.83 8.66  21  0.156 
(0.270) 
0 0.93 11  0.43 
(0.26) 
0.08 1.20 14 
(0.9; 1.0]  6.66 
(0.59) 
5.85 7.67  11  0.111 
(0.052) 
0.06 0.22 11 0.26 
(0.13) 
0.13 0.52 12 
CONC = 1  6.48 
(0.50) 
5.54 7.15  15  0.228 
(0.158) 
0.01 0.56 13 0.43 
(0.22) 
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Graph 4   Plot of CONC and the Conditional Mean of LOGLP, LAY and TURN 
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Table 14  Estimation Results – Specification 1a 
dep. Var. LOGLPt Estimation 1a.1  Estimation 1a.2  Estimation 1a.3 












C 1.947***  2.337***  1.954***  2.357***  2.179***  2.544*** 
LOGLPt-1 0.770***  0.724***  0.792***  0.745***  0.724***  0.682*** 
LOGEMPt -0.711***  -0.059**  -0.092***  -0.078***  -0.084***  -0.068*** 
IND_H&M    -0.195***   -0.203***   -0.184*** 
IND_OTHER    -0.064   -0.086   -0.059 
REGBOH    -0.044   -0.060   -0.052 
REGMOR    -0.046   -0.055   -0.100 
SHSTATEt -0.155*  -0.144  -0.147*  -0.127    
 (-1.714)  (-1.605)  (-1.737)  (-1.503)    
SHINSt 0.145 0.090     0.263*  0.202 
 (1.012) (0.606)     (1.715)  (1.255) 
CONCt 0.144 0.132 0.083 0.078   0.344***  0.331*** 
 (1.260) (1.153) (0.812) (0.765)   (3.718)  (3.285) 
R-squared adjusted  0.61 0.62 0.64 0.65   0.57 0.58 
No. of obs.  313 313 340 340   376 376 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significance at 1 percent, ** means significance at 5 percent, * means 
significance at 10 percent.  
 
 
All the specifications without covariates have been estimated by OLS, FE and RE models, but the results of FE 
and RE estimates are insignificant and LM-test favors in all cases OLS over FE/RE. Thus only the OLS estimates 
are reported. 
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Table 15  Estimation Results – Specification 2a 
dep. var. LOGLPt Estimation 2a.1        Estimation 2a.2 












C 2.282***  2.812***  2.599***  3.037***   2.999*** 
LOGLPt-1 0.769***  0.718***  0.724***  0.680***  0.192***  0.676*** 
LOGEMPt -0.073***  -0.059***  -0.084***  -0.065**  -0.277***  -0.095*** 
IND_H&M    -0.232***   -0.210***    
IND_OTHER    -0.075   -0.064    
REGBOH    -0.040   -0.039    
REGMOR    -0.031   -0.098    
SHSTATEt -0.207**  -0.204**       
 (-2.234)  (-2.208)        
SHINSt 0.126  0.0.57  0.268*  0.197  0.466  0.292* 
 (0.873)  (0.378)  (1.727)  (1.207)  (0.957)  (1.950) 
CONC_0020 t -0.256 -0.346**  -0.393***  -0.464***  -0.440***  -0.421*** 
 (-1.589)  (-2.138)  (-2.981)  (-3.507)  (-2.849)  (-3.605) 
CONC_2030 t -0.284 -0.369*  -0.253  -0.321*  -0.457**  -0.301** 
 (-1.474)  (-1.918)  (-1.445)  (-1.846)  (-2.461)  (-1.966) 
CONC_3040 t -0.289* -0.371**  -0.306**  -0.363**  -0.423**  -0.337** 
 (-1.706)  (-2.189)  (-2.048)  (-2.441)  (-2.410)  (-2.538) 
CONC_4070 t -0.253* -0.362**  -0.257*  -0.344***  -0.386**  -0.291** 
 (-1.630)  (-2.305)  (-1.961)  (-2.602)  (-2.528)  (-2.484) 
CONC_7090 t -0.208 -0.355**  -0.154 -0.286*  -0.348**  -0.186 
 (-1.218)  (-2.037) (-1.021)  (-1.858)  (-2.119)  (-1.397) 
R-squared adjusted  0.61 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.68 0.57 
No. of obs.  313 313 376 376 376 376 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significance at 1 percent, ** means significance at 5 percent, * means 
significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 16  Estimation Results – Specification 3a 










  (-0.070) 
CONCt 1.371* 
  (1.908) 
CONCt-squared -3.354* 
  (-1.661) 
CONCt-cubed 2.491* 
  (1.756) 
R-squared adjusted  0.57 
No. of obs.  324 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significance at 1 percent,  
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Table 17  Estimation Results – Specification 4a 
dep. var. LOGLPt Estimation 4a.1        Estimation 4a.2  Estimation 4a.3 












C (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+) 
LOGLPt-1 (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+) 
LOGEMPt (–)  ***  (–)  **  (–)  ***  (–)  ***  (–)  ***  (–)   
IND_H&M    (–)  ***   (–)  ***   (–)  *** 
IND_OTHER    insignif.   insignif.   insignif. 
REGBOH    insignif.   insignif.   insignif. 
REGMOR    insignif.   insignif.   insignif. 
SHSTATEt -0.19*  -0.18*  -0.18**  -0.16*    
 (-1.925)  (-1.792)  (-1.979)  (-1.742)    
SHINSt 0.14  0.09     0.27*  0.20 
 (1.005)  (0.617)     (1.738)  (1.255) 
CONC.0to30 t -0.13  -0.08  -0.21  -0.16  0.42 0.46 
 (-0.391)  (-0.228)  (-0.639)  (-0.453)  (1.412) (1.549) 
CONC.30to60 t 0.27  0.10  0.20  0.06  0.16 -0.09 
 (0.767)  (0.281)  (0.611)  (0.183)  (0.436) (-0.024) 
CONC.over60 t 0.43  0.62  0.31  0.44  0.62* 0.78** 
 (1.074)  (1.549)  (0.931)  (1.341)  (1.735)  (2.206) 
R-squared adjusted  0.61 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.65 
Akaike info. crit.  1.340  1.332  1.323  1.313  1.570  1.559 
No. of obs.  313 313 340 340 376 376 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significance at 1 percent, ** means significance at 5 percent, * means 
significance at 10 percent. 
 
 
All the specifications without covariates have been estimated by OLS, FE and RE models, but the results of FE 
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Table 18  Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
Dep. var. CONCt Estimation A  Estimation B  Estimation C 
 Coeff.    t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat.  
C 0.765  ***  2.831 0.843***  6.326 0.758***  6.271
LOGEMPt -0.108  ***  -4.337 -0.109***  -5.324 -0.104***  -5.189
IND_LIGHT 0.155    0.239    
IND_FOOD -0.150    -1.123 -0.151  -1.428  
IND_HEAVY 0.005    0.063    
IND_OTHER 0.044    0.638    
REGMOR         0.092**  2.165
ROAt-1 0.00027  ***  5.045 0.00026***  5.293 0.00025***  5.096
EXPORTt-1 0.352  ***  2.782 0.324***  3.165 0.337***  3.391
LAYt-1 0.539  **  2.596 0.528***  2.645 0.484**  2.426
TURNt-1 -0.025    -0.239   
CPER92 0.730  **  2.481 0.676**  2.570 0.611**  2.341
CMAT92 0.099    0.409   
CDEP92 -0.046    -0.080   
R-squared adjusted  0.36  0.38  0.39 
No. of obs.  173  173  173 
Note: *** means significance at 1 percent, ** means significance at 5 percent, * means significance at 10 percent 
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This thesis examines the dependence of firm restructuring on private outside ownership 
concentration in Czech manufacturing sector after privatization. It starts with the 
argumentation that the most important actors in the post-privatization ownership structure in 
the Czech Republic were investment privatization funds, followed by the state, and that the 
‘rules of the game’ opened a large space for moral hazard. Based on the realization of these 
Czech specialties and on the logic of the break-through article by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s from 1988, the paper operationalizes the benefits and the costs of ownership 
concentration by four effects – incentive, manager-entrenchment, outsider-entrenchment and 
tunneling effects. This leads to the hypothesis that the concentration-restructuring function in 
the post-privatization Czech environment is increasing for sufficiently low as well as for 
sufficiently high values of concentration, while its slope in the inner band of concentration is 
attenuated or even negative due to the entrenchment and tunneling costs of concentration. This 
hypothesis is tested on an unbalanced panel data on 90 Czech companies for the years 1991-
1998. OLS, FE and RE regressions with labor productivity on the left-hand sides partly 
confirm the hypothesis, especially the expected shape of the function for high and moderate 
concentration. However, no significant specification is found when instrumental variables are 
used to remove possible selection bias. Neither OLS, FE and RE, nor IV estimations showed a 
significant systematic relationship between private outside ownership concentration and the 
layoff and turnover ratios. The results in general report a negative effect of the state’s 
shareholding and a positive effect of insiders’ shareholding on restructuring. 